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A CRITIQUE OF THE UNIQUELY ADVERSARIAL NATURE OF THE U.S.
LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
REINFORCING EXISTING POWER HIERARCHIES
JIM WILETS * & ARETO A. IMOUKHUEDE * *
"For many claims, trial by adversarial contest must, in time, go the way of the ancient trial by
battle and blood. Our litigation system is too costly, too painful, too destructive for a truly
civilized people."
-Chief Justice Warren Burger
This article argues that the uniquely adversarial nature of the United States litigation
system, rooted in the medieval English system of "trial by battle," has replicated itself in almost
all aspects of American society, distinguishing the United States from even its common law
counterparts that shared the genesis of their legal systems in English "trial by battle."
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This "trial by battle" is often characterized in the context of speech by terms such as the
'marketplace of ideas," or in the context of economics by terms such as "the law of the jungle.,"
Even resolution of basic Constitutional concepts are subject to battles between parties, rather
than a proactive determination by a Constitutional Court as can be found in many other legal
systems. Thus, American society is unique from all other industrialized nations in the extent to
which it employs adversarial techniques to resolve conflicts in the areas of contract law, criminal
law, constitutional law, labor law, and economic and social policy, in addition to its legal system.
This article suggests that the implications of this emphasis on procedure over substance
are profound, and that the shibboleth of "procedural fairness" invoked to justify disparate
substantive outcomes may be more illusory than real.
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INTRODUCTION
In a previous article,' Professor James Wilets analyzed the enormous amount of
I James D. Wilets, Gender Dimorphism in the U.S. Legal System: A "Post-Feminist" and Comparative
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jurisprudential literature positing that the structure, values and processes of the American legal
and educational system, are fundamentally "male-centered." 2 This previous article focused
heavily on the gendered lens with which many commentators have viewed the adversarial battle
among parties in court, sometimes called the "gladiator" model, 3 and in competition in law
school. Wilets argued, however, that many of the dysfunctional aspects of the American legal
system, are not essentially male, but simply different from the jurisprudential approach of the
great majority of the world's legal systems, many of which themselves are male dominated, and
sometimes more male dominated than that of the U.S. legal system.4 The previous work argued
that the adversarial approach may express itself in ways that certainly appear "male," as that term
is constructed in the United States but in fact the roots of this adversarial approach can be found
primarily in the unique Anglo-Saxon historical legal experience rather than in any essentially
male aspect of that legal system.
Professors Imoukhuede and Wilets take this work further than the previous article. In
this article, the authors argue that the American adversarial, or gladiatorial, approach to dispute
resolution goes well beyond the original British model and has replicated the adversarial litigation
approach in areas as diverse as: constitutional law (including areas such as speech, justiciability
and fundamental rights), economics, contracts, labor relations, and even social benefits such as
education and medical care. The United States' particular gladiatorial - or adversarial - approach
ostensibly focuses on the fairness of the battle itself, rather than on the specific substantive result
or outcome. As this article illustrates, however, the "procedural fairness" upon which this dispute
resolution and lawmaking framework operates is, in many cases, illusory.
Accordingly, the purpose of this article is not simply to illustrate a comparative law
phenomenon, but also to suggest that many of the economic, legal, political and social differences
apparent in otherwise similar societies can be explained by differing fundamental assumptions
Critique, 18 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 193 (2011)
2 Id. See also LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMAN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 28 (1997); Susan D. Carle, Review Essay: Gender in the Construction of the Lawyer's Persona: Florence Kelley
and the Nation's Work: the Rise of the Women's Political Culture, 1830-1900, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 239, 244 (Spring
1999); Tanisha M. Bailey, The Master's Tools: Deconstructing the Socratic Method and its Disparate Impact on Women
through the Prism of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 3 MARGINS: MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 125, 125
(2003); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 1175, 1177-78 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 644 (1983) (arguing that the "objective standard" is simply the male point of view in
disguise. Traditional liberal legalism makes male dominance invisible and legitimate by adopting the male point of view in
law at the same time as it enforces that view on society); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
75, 75 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession:
Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 289, 312 (1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a
Diferent Voice, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 40 (1985); Darren Rosenblum, Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender
Inequality on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional Traditions, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1125 (2006); Susan P.
Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations about Women, the Academy, and the Legal
Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L & POL'Y 119, 121-122 (1997); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1988) and Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 867, 867-69
(1988).
3 Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations about Women, the
Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L & POL'Y 119, 122 (1997);
4 Wilets, supra note 1, at 194-96.
Id.
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about how to resolve dispute and mediate conflicting rights. This article suggests that the
implications of this emphasis on procedure over substance are profound, and that the shibboleth
of "procedural fairness" invoked to justify disparate substantive outcomes may be more illusory
than real. We will, however, leave it to the reader to determine whether substantial fairness is best
achieved through procedural fairness, or is best achieved through legislative codification of a
specific substantive result.
I. A HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE ADVERSARIAL NATURE
OF UNITED STATES ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND LAW
The distinction between procedure and substance is critical in this analysis. Process is
central to three aspects of law: (1) the manner in which law is created; 2) the underlying
assumptions held by the legal system; and (3) how specific disputes are mediated or resolved. We
will explore each of these distinctions in turn.
With respect to the manner in which law is created, there are more similarities than
differences between the United States and other democracies. In a democracy, the creation of law
such as statutes and constitutions is largely a political process. What does generally distinguish
the U.S. and other common law countries is that judicial interpretation and application of law
itself creates new law.6 This concept of "judge made" law of course arises from prior judicial
precedent, which itself originally arose from an adversarial litigation context.
The United States, however, is markedly different from even many of its common law
counterparts in the assumptions within the law regarding how different constituencies should
pursue their interests or mediate their differences. Most democracies, whether common law or
civil law, assume that their political bodies can create certain kinds of positive law that are not
open to negotiation or waiver by contract. Such assumptions may include a minimum wage,
vacations, severance pay, the prohibition of hate speech, a certain level of medical care, etc.
The United States does not differ from many of its common law counterparts in how
specific disputes are mediated or resolved. Common law legal systems share an adversarial form
of dispute resolution in the legal realm. What is unique about the United States is how it has
applied this particularly adversarial form of common law dispute resolution to most aspects of its
society. Some commentators have referred to the United States as a "jungle," where only the
fittest can survive.8 This article avoids such normative characterizations and is limited it to
investigating how this distinctive American phenomenon manifests itself in different areas of the
6 See What is the Difference Between Common and Civil Law?, THE ECONOMIST (July 16, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/07/economist-explains-10 [https://perma.cc/A95R-GUED].
See Frank B. Cross, Book Review: America the Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REV. 189-190 (2003).
See David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 371-72 (2001); Jennifer L. Hochschild, The Word American Ends in "Can": The Ambiguous Promise of the
American Dream, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 139 (1992) (citing WILLIAM G. SUMNER, THE CHALLENGE OF FACTS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 25 (Albert G. Keller ed., 1914)) ("[W]e cannot go outside of this alternative: liberty, inequality, survival of
the fittest; not-liberty, equality, survival of the unfittest. The former carries society forward and favors all its best
members; the latter carries society downwards and favors all its worst members ... The growth of a large business . . . is
merely a survival of the fittest."); Lawrence S. Krieger, What We're Not Telling Law Students-and Lawyers-that they
Really Need to Know: Some Thoughts-in-Action Toward Revitalizing the Profession from its Roots, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 25
(1999) (A "law-of-the-jungle" mentality is encouraged by this pervasive misperception of need, potentially creating a need
to defeat, rather than support, classmates and peers . . . the adversarial nature of the legal system, which can encourage a
win-lose, law-of-the-jungle mentality-literally survival of the fittest).
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law, and the implications of this uniquely American phenomenon.
A. From "Trial by Battle" to American Legalism
This section posits that the adversarial, gladiatorial tradition in common law litigation is
inextricably related to the divergent American legal, economic and political approach to a wide
variety of issues. The peculiar adversarial manner in which the United States approaches
economic, social, political and legal disputes differs so dramatically from other societies that an
investigation into the peculiar economic, political and social history of the United States is
warranted in order to understand why this difference continues to persist in so many aspects of
American society. This article suggests that the implications of this emphasis on procedure over
substance are profound, and that the shibboleth of "procedural fairness" invoked to justify
disparate substantive outcomes may be more illusory than real.
All common law countries share the common history of the British legal system, which
incorporated a literal "trial by battle" in its earliest genesis. 9 This battle could take place between
the parties or, somewhat later, through a symbolic battle between the defendant and God, also
known as "trial by ordeal." 10 The trial by battle was narrated by numerous historians and authors,
but the description which is more helpful to our research is that of F.M. Powicke, English legal
historian, who noted how law and force were expressly interrelated throughout common law legal
history:
Law in a feudal society was inseparable from force, but not obscured by it: they were
informed by the theory of contract which informed all feudal relations .. . Force was
never absent, yet was never uncontrolled. In civil procedure we find the elements of war,
such as the duel, and the hue and cry; and in war, we find constant applications of legal
theory. War was a great lawsuit. The truce was very like an essoin, a treaty drawn up on
the lines of a final concord, the hostage a surety, service in the field was the counterpart
of suit of court. The closeness of the analogy between the field of battle and the law court
is seen in judicial combat. Trial by battle was a possible incident in all negotiations.
According to Chief Justice Warren Burger, the American system of dispute resolution
9 Wilets, supra note 1, at 197; Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice:
Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 39 (2002) ("Civil and criminal disputes in
medieval England were decided by primitive trials by battle"); JOHN H. LANBEIN, ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 99-100 (2009); Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of
the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L. J. 713 (1983); Edward L. Rubin, Trial by Battle. Trial by
Argument, 56 ARK. L. REV. 261, 263-69 (2003).
10 The so-called "trial by ordeal" included specific litigation techniques, such as the "trial by fire" and the
"ordeal of cold water." See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, 40 FAM CT. REV. 36, 39 (2002) ("Civil and criminal disputes in
medieval England were decided by. . trial by ordeal"); see also Stephan Landsman, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A
DESCRIPTION AND A DEFENSE 8-9 (1984); see generally Henry Lea, The Wager of Battle, in Paul Bohannan, Ed., LAW
AND WARFARE: STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONFLICT 233-53) (1967). For an outstanding statistical analysis and
description of medieval English forms of adjudication and their prevalence, see Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the
Decline of Private Prosecution in Thirteenth-Century England, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 ( 2001). See also Judge Dale A.
Kimball, Freedom and Independent Courts, 16 UTAH B.J. 29 (2003); Wilets, supra note 1, at 210.
1 Matthew Strickland, WAR AND CHIVALRY: THE CONDUCT AND PERCEPTION OF WAR IN ENGLAND AND
NORMANDY, 1066-1217, at 4 (citing F.M. Powicke, THE Loss OF NORMANDY, 1189-1204, at 242 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
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has preserved the traditional adversarial trial by battle. 12 Some commentators have distinguished
the trial by battle from the adversary system, arguing that the latter is a relatively new concept.13
Those commentators, however, have tended to focus only on the technical aspects of the modern
adversarial system, which certainly did arise later, mainly to offset certain specific, problematic
consequences of the system in place. The common-law ancestors already understood that the
system needed some adjustments in order to obtain more fair "divine judgments." Thus, they
introduced rules excusing from trials by battle all those people-like elderly or infirm persons and
women-that were physically unfit for such a battle. Similarly, the present system is replete with
examples of guarantees with the main--if not the only--scope of granting even-handed
proceedings. Accordingly, it seems that the present adversarial system is fundamentally analogous
to the original "trial by battle," even if the mechanisms have changed throughout time.14 Indeed,
as noted by Chief Justice Burger, our legal system still relies on an adversarial conflict between
the participants, although "at great cost to the parties, and to society in general."1 5
While the English were attempting to adjudicate "by beating each other to death, or
drowning each other in an effort to determine God's will," 16 other civilizations, were adopting
different-maybe more rational-means of resolving disputes and creating-or adjusting-the
law.1 7 This is not to say that the British were the only ones to opt for such "barbaric" forms of
trial and legal procedure, but it is worth noting that other societies in Europe, Asia and Africa18
12 Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts'
Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO L.J. 185 (1983) (speaking about the battle model of the past and future's law field and
criminal justice system); see infra Part I and II.
13 See, e.g., Paul T. Wangerin, The Political and Economic Roots of the "Adversary System" of Justice and
"Alternative Dispute Resolution", 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 203, 206-8 (1994) ("Adversarial proceedings themselves
did not fully develop until the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Europe"). See also Stephan Landsman, THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1984); Roscoe Pound, JURISPRUDENCE 696-703 (1959); Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the
Adversary System and the Changing Role of the Advocate in that System, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 25 (1981).
14 Barbara Dawson, Michele L. Stevenson, Getting Help with ADR: A Guide to the Main Players, 10 FEB
Bus. L. TODAY 51, 54 (2001).
'5 See Wilets, supra notel, at 197.
16 See, e.g., Paul R. Hyams, "Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law," in ON THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (1981) at 90-126
17 See Wilets, supra note 1, at 211-13 (Of course, "rational" does not always mean "good," as evidenced by
the variant of the civil law used during the Inquisition). To avoid oversimplification, it is important to note that English
theories and philosophy of law shared a great deal with their continental counterparts, even though the actual procedure of
dispute resolution may have differed substantially. See generally Harold J. Berman, The Origins Of Historical
Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1656-7 (1994) ("It is conventional wisdom that distinctively
English conceptions of the nature, sources, and purposes of law can be traced back to the early history of the English
common law in the twelfth to fifteenth centuries. In fact, however, there is little in the legal literature of those centuries
that distinguishes English philosophy from that of other peoples of Western Christendom.").
I8 See, e.g., Remigius N. Nwabueze, Historical and Comparative Contexts for the Evolution of Conflict of
Law in Nigeria, 8 ILSA J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 31, 32 (2001) ("[1]t was in the Italian city-states in the Middle Ages that a
scientific approach was adopted toward the solution of disputes arising from transactions and intercourse with foreigners.
They had separate courts, laws and magistrates for that purpose"); see also Kenneth Pennington, "Law, Procedure of,
1000-1500," DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES, 7 (1986) at 502-506; Evan R. Seamone, When Wishing On A Star Just
Won't Do: The Legal Basis For International Cooperation In The Mitigation Of Asteroid Impacts And Similar
Transboundary Disasters, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1091, at 1125, n.167 and accompanying text, citing RONALD W. CARSTENS,
THE MEDIEVAL ANTECEDENTS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 55 (1992) (in turn crediting John of Paris (1250/4-1304) for
articulating the ideal of "stewardship as an authorization to use or to distribute goods," and the idea that "the community
346 [Vol. 20.4
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employed more logical means of creating law at a much earlier time.
In Europe, the greater development of more "rational" or "civilized" civil law
approaches to dispute resolution flourished in the more Romanized areas of the former Roman
Empire. While the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon areas of Europe adopted forms of the civil law
later. 19 The reason for that divergent development is discernible when considering the particularly
historically focused evolution of the civil law, based in the ancient and longstanding Roman-and
even earlier-legal jurisprudential traditions.
As opposed to the common law, the civil law system creates law through a conscious,
deliberate, rational formulation and application of rules to regulate human conduct. 20 The rules
are designed to cover every potential factual circumstance that could foreseeably arise.21 To use
an imperfect analogy, civil law can be conceptualized as an old-fashioned hotel reception area
with its set of cubbyholes in which keys and mail are placed. The law is structured as a set of
cubbyholes of legal rules, into which every factual exigency can be placed. This civil law
approach can be compared to the "ad hoc" manner by which law is created in the common law,
although the apparently ad hoc nature of the common-law lawmaking process can understate the
ways in which the assumptions in the common law create outcomes that generally perpetrate
existing power structures and hierarchies. This is consistent with the overall thesis of this article
that the common law process of lawmaking ultimately replicates pre-existing power hierarchies.
Comparative legal scholar Richard B. Cappalli describes the civil law's arguably more
rational and transparent lawmaking process as follows:
[The civil law's] centerpiece is the civil code, a vast elaboration of legal concepts,
definitions, institutions, principles, and rules stated at a high level of generality and
purporting to cover the entire realm of private relations: persons and the family,
adoption, succession, property rights, contractual obligations, agency, surety, unlawful
harm-causing acts, labor, companies, prescription of actions, evidence, creditor
preferences, and others. The goal of the civil code is to state in a general, orderly,
integrated, and complete way the rules of private law needed to regulate private
relations. 22
Legal commentators have named this elaborate process as "legal science." The civil law
is scientific in the sense that legal scholars must employ rational thought to create a logical legal
structure. Deductive logic is then required to determine the law that should be applied to a
particular set of factual circumstances.23 Still in the words of Cappalli:
determines jurisdiction over the use of common things"); id. at 81 (citing Marsilio of Padua (1275/80-1342), based on the
Aristotelian notion that "[t]he utility of government is measured by the degree to which it can provide the conditions
necessary for a 'sufficient life').
'9 See generally Katherine Fischer Drew, Public vs. Private Enforcement Of The Law In The Early Middle
Ages: Fifth To Twelfth Centuries, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1583, 1587 (1995).
20 William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L.
REV. 677, 687 (2000).
21 See id.
22 Richard B. Cappalli, At The Point Of Decision: The Common Law's Advantage Over The Civil Law, 12
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 87 (1998)
23 See id. at 94.
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The civilian codes, substantive and procedural, are structured as magnificent exercises in
logic, starting with the most general purposes, propositions, and definitions, and
logically elaborating their implications and interactions in a network of increasingly
detailed rules. Once launched, the codes form the premises for case solutions. Through
logical reasoning, deductive and analogic, the civilian lawyers and judges extract the
code's solutions to myriad human conflicts. 24
Unlike the civil law, common law is created in piecemeal fashion, through a series of
conflicts, or cases, between parties, occurring in a highly fact dependent context. In order to make
sense out of these ad hoc legal determinations, these cases require an analytically complex
process of synthesis. Thus, legal scholars must distinguish or analogize the facts of one case to
those of other cases to provide some modicum of consistency among the different cases. Despite
the complexity of the process, the results may not be as consistent as the rigorousness of the
process would suggest. Depending upon the ultimate goal of the judge or parties, one case can
often be differentiated from another without a theoretically consistent or neutral basis for doing
so. It is sufficient to observe the amount of closely split U.S. Supreme Court decisions to detect
that the common law synthesis process (or stare decisis) is less than scientifically accurate.
Moreover, the correlation between the Justices' rulings and their pre-existing ideological
inclinations seems to suggest that the inconsistencies in the described process are not random, but
rather dependent on the particular makeup of a court at a specific point in time. 25 Thus,
frequently, the process can be an attempt to mask the "trial by battle" by a pretense of theoretical
consistency embodied in the legal concept of stare decisis.26
Conversely, in the civil law, decisions are based on the existing facts and must rise and
fall on the merits of the application of the law to the specific facts of the specific case. 27 This
does not mean civil law judges are always impartial; they are actually far from it.28 However, a
civil law judge may render a certain judgment in a certain case based on the equitable nature of
the conflicting interests without violating the common law's doctrine of stare decisis. This
permits the judge in a civil law trial to apply the law in a legal manner without having to preside
over a battle by warrior-lawyers arguing which cases are closer to the case at bar.
Clearly this view of the civil law contrasts with the common shibboleth that the civil
code is designed in part to deprive the judges of arbitrary discretion. In theory, civil law judges
cannot exercise discretion since they are strictly bound by positive law.29 In practice, however,
the absence of the stare decisis principle gives them considerably more latitude in deciding how
to apply the text of a Code to a particular set of facts.
To be fair to the common law, the adversarial nature of the common law as opposed to
the civil law can, in fact, sometimes promote fairness and justice. For example, the use of juries
as independent fact-finders clearly helps avoiding sole reliance on potentially biased judges.
Moreover, the adversary system between lawyers engaged in adversarial combat also arguably
2 Id. at 89
25 Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (May 10, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/upshot/the-polarized-court.html [https://perma.cc/VTV3-WXV2].
26 See id.
27 See Colin B. Picker, International Law's Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction, 41 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'LL. 1083, 1109 (2008).
28 See id.
29 See id. at 1108.
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permits a greater exposition of every possible fact of relevance. In many civil law countries,
bureaucratically-organized judges control all trial procedures, such as fact gathering, selection of
witnesses and especially the final decision making. In adversarial systems like the U.S., the
parties' attorneys control those processes.30 The consequence is that American law can
sometimes be more flexible, and open to the new legal and policy arguments set forth by the
parties and their lawyers.31
Nevertheless, as this article argues, those admitted advantages of the common law, and
they are by no means exhaustive, should not obscure the hidden preferences for pre-existing
power hierarchies that the common law frequently propagates. And those hidden and not so
hidden preferences for pre-existing power hierarchies are not limited to the legal system. As
noted above, the sui generis United States gladiatorial approach to resolving disputes is also
exhibited in resolving labor disputes, delineating the limits of free speech, as well as in the more
quintessentially legal procedural issues of determining guilt and innocence in a criminal trial or
economic liability in a civil trial. Indeed, many legal commentators defend the adversarial system
precisely because it reflects the competition that is encouraged in other sectors of American
society. 32
B. An Unbalanced "Matching of Forces: "The Legal Realist Critique"
A "legal realist" would view this adversarial or "gladiatorial" structure of the United
States legal, political, economic and social system as not simply a product of the unique common
law history and an accident of its translation to the United States. Nor would they view the unique
American adversarial legal structure as a quixotic byproduct of a unique American individualism.
Inequality of resources means that no entity can ever truly "fight" procedurally on a level playing
field, and this procedural inequality can promulgate substantive inequality. 33 Some commentators
30 Robert A. Kagan, Should Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism? 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 165,
167 (1997).
31 See id. (listing seven distinctive characteristics to describe this concept).
32 See Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in David Luban, Ed., THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 172, 174 (David Luban, ed., 1983) (adversarial system is culturally
appropriate for Americans because of their predominantly competitive society and reflects "the same deep-seated values
we place on competition among economic suppliers, political parties, and moral and political ideals. It is an individualistic
system of judicial process for an individualistic society"); see also Anatol Rapaport, Theories of Conflict Resolution and
Law, in COURTS AND TRIALS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 22, 29 (1975) (U.S. adversarial system reflects the
emphasis on competition in our society, and is a "direct transplant of competitive economics into the apparatus of
justice").
33 See Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintifs Lose Under
Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 552 (2012) ("The standing of those directly regulated by government
action most often businesses-is usually obvious, but those who benefit from regulation-by breathing less pollution or
competing for integrated housing, for example have a harder time showing standing to sue," and "the skilled strategist
knows that one can no more predict the outcome of a case from the facts and the law than one can predict the outcome of a
game of chess from the positions of the pieces and the rules of the game. In either case, one needs to know who is
playing."). See also Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405, 1412
(2000) ("The legal strategist manipulates those odds in a game of skill, expanding and developing the array of decisions,
issues, and problems in a manner calculated to confuse and ultimately overwhelm the opponent. Even if the "merits"
should ever reach a decision maker, it will be a decision maker identified by the game, and the "merits" will reach that
decision maker in a form determined by the game."); Gene R. Nichol, Law's Disengaged Left, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 547, 555
(2000) ("[1]f a serious candidate takes positions that are congenial to powerful economic interests, funding advantages will
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have argued that this is not simply an unfortunate, unintended consequence of the adversarial
system. Commentators, some of whom are termed "legal realists," would argue that the central
purpose of this narrow interpretation of "case" and "controversy" is precisely to maintain the
relative material positions of those entering into legal battle. In other words, without a substantive
outcome determined by the will of the majority of the people in a jurisdiction, legal disputes are
likely to be won, on average, by those parties with the greatest resources available for fighting
that legal battle. Marc Galanter illustrates in a seminal study, 34 that:
accrue. If, on the other hand, a candidate serves as an advocate for the poor and dispossessed, funding sources will
diminish. Every politician knows this. Every politician's fundraising staff knows it even better. In a system in which
campaign spending has a significant impact on electoral success, governance is thus systematically slanted toward the
economically powerful and privileged."); Gene R. Nichol, Law's Disengaged Left, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 547, 557 (2000) ("A
late-nineteenth-century Republican senator from Pennsylvania, Boies Penrose, described his role this way: 'I believe in a
division of labor. You send us to Congress; we pass the laws under which you make money. . . and out of your profits you
further contribute to our campaign funds to send us back to pass more laws to enable you to make more money.' Penrose's
picture of the dynamics of American politics remains too true today."); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 517 (1985). (White, J., dissenting: "The candidate may be forced to please the
spenders rather than the voters, and the two groups are not identical."); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal:
Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 578 (1990). ("[T]he current era can be characterized as one of
corporate due process. Consider, for example, the following recent Supreme Court decisions: a textile corporation
successfully invoked the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause to avoid retrial in a criminal antitrust action; a
consortium of major corporations, including the First National Bank of Boston, joined in a first amendment lawsuit that
overturned state restrictions on corporate spending for political referendums; an electrical and plumbing concern invoked
the fourth amendment to thwart federal inspections conducted under the Occupational Safety and Health Act; and, a
California public utility relied on the first amendment to overturn state regulations designed to lower utility rates."); Jill E.
Fisch, The "Bad Man" Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1593, 1605-1608 (2006) ("Corporations spend millions of dollars annually seeking political influence through lobbying . .
. Corporations are not simply constrained by society's legal rules; they play a substantial role in shaping the rules by which
they are governed."); Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263, 266-267 (1982) ("Holmes said in an early essay: [w]hatever body may possess the supreme power for the
moment is certain to have interests inconsistent with others which have competed unsuccessfully. The more powerful
interests must be more or less reflected in legislation; which, like every other device or man or beast, must tend in the long
run to aid the survival of the fittest . . . [I]t is no sufficient condemnation of legislation that it favors one class at the
expense of another; for much or all legislation does that . .. That fact is that legislation . . . is necessarily made a means by
which a body, having the power, put burdens which are disagreeable to them on the shoulders of somebody else.");
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 149 (2003) (quoting declaration of former Senator Alan Simpson:
"Too often, Members' first thought is not what is right or what they believe, but how it will affect fundraising. Who, after
all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way one thinks about-and quite possibly votes on-an
issue? . . . When you don't pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will never get any more money from that
piper. Since money is the mother's milk of politics, you never want to be in that situation."); Fed. Election Comm'n, 540
U.S. at 149 (quoting declaration of former Senator Warren Rudman, "Special interests who give large amounts of soft
money to political parties do in fact achieve their objectives. They do get access. Sitting Senators and House Members
have limited amounts of time, but they make time available in their schedules to meet with representatives of business and
unions and wealthy individuals who gave large sums to their parties. These are not idle chit-chats about the philosophy of
democracy . . . Senators are pressed by their benefactors to introduce legislation, to ament legislation, to block legislation,
and to vote on legislation in a certain way.").
34 Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974); see Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DuKE L.J. 1405,
1450-71 (2000) (discussing how companies strategize by "case selection," "making a record," "legal planning," "media
spin," "cost strategies," "delay strategies," "external strategies," "contractual strategies," "forum shopping," and
"settlement strategies," all of which involves considerable expense above and beyond arguing the merits of the case).
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"haves" will win more frequently because they are likely to have favorable law on their
side, superior material resources, and better lawyers and because a number of advantages
accrue to them as a result of their "repeat player" status. Superior resources allow the
"haves" to hire the best available legal representation and to incur legal expenses, such
as those associated with extensive discovery and expert witnesses that may increase the
chances of success at trial. In addition, as repeat players, they will reap the benefits of
greater litigation experience, including the ability to develop and implement a
comprehensive litigation strategy that may involve forum shopping and making informed
judgments regarding their prospects of winning at trial or on appeal. 35
In a 1995 Title VII case,36 Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Richard Posner frequently cited
Galanter and his work discussing the inherently unequal procedural position in which the
adversarial system puts the economically disadvantaged party. Posner concluded, however, that
this was an inevitable result of the adversarial system. While neither Judge Posner nor Mr.
Galanter would reject the adversarial system because of this result, their observations reinforce a
thesis of this article that the problem of procedural inequality in the adversarial system is inherent
and unavoidable in the system itself. Judge Posner wrote that:
Even with the recent amendments to Title VII, the expected judgment in an employment
discrimination case, especially one brought by an hourly wage worker, will rarely be
large enough to repay a substantial investment in the development of evidence at the
summary judgment stage, which is to say before the case even gets to trial. And on the
other hand employers have incentives to invest heavily in the defense of these cases, in
order to deter the bringing of them. This asymmetry puts the plaintiff at a disadvantage,
as this case illustrates. There is no basis for confidence that the defendant did not
discriminate against Russell on account of his race and age; it is simply that Russell has
not presented enough evidence, perhaps because he could not afford to present more, to
withstand the company's motion. 37
C. Constitutional Adjudication
At the risk of generalization, it can be stated that constitutional adjudication in the United
States differs from constitutional adjudication in most other countries in a number of salient ways.
These differences can have a profound effect on substantive outcomes in ways that distort or
shape political and economic systems.
1. The "Cases and Controversies" Requirement for Adversarial Constitutional Adjudication
Reinforces Existing Power Hierarchies
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the inclusion of the terms
"cases" and "controversy" in Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution to limit
judicial adjudication, including constitutional adjudication, to only those cases where there are
35 Donald R. Songer et al., Do the Haves Come Out Ahead Over Time? Applying Galanter's Framework to
Decisions of the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 1925-1988, 33 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 811, 812 (1999).
36 Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 70-71 (7th Cir. 1995).
37 Id. at 70-71.
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parties in an actual, adversarial dispute.38 The Supreme Court has noted that limiting a court's
jurisdiction to a specific case or controversy has the advantage of presenting the issues in question
in their sharpest contrast, and therefore in the most suitable context for adjudication. 39
However, most civil law countries employ a means of constitutional adjudication that
does not rely solely upon a conflict between actual parties to resolve disputes over constitutional
interpretation. 40 A great many of these countries employ Constitutional Courts that decide
constitutional issues separate from an actual case, sometimes even before a disputed statute goes
into effect.41 This can be observed, inter alia, in France42 and Germany.43 The European Union
provides a particularly insightful example of this separation of constitutional adjudication from a
particular case or controversy. 44 These divergent approaches have wide-ranging implications,
38 See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (explaining policy justifying the "case or
controversy" requirement); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1961) (explaining the case or controversy requirement
in relation to doctrines of standing, ripeness and mootness); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60
(1992) (explaining the standing requirement and its injury in fact and redressability elements); City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102 (1983) (illustrating the element of the injury in fact); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502-03
(1975) (representing insufficient showing of causation and lack of redressability of the standing element); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (illustrating lack of redressability element of standing); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (explaining the prohibition of third party standing and its exceptions); Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-50 (1967) (explaining ripeness doctrine element); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 507-08
(1961) (showing insufficiency of ripeness element); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1974) (explaining
mootness doctrine); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (explaining mootness doctrine and one of its exceptions);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (describing political question doctrine).
39 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (the Court opined the core question of standing
doctrine is whether the appellants had "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions"); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (the Court considered the
constitutional challenge to be "made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution", when the issues
were "contested with the necessary adverseness" and the litigation was "pursued with the necessary vigor"); U.S. v.
Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961) (the Court explained that cases lacking concrete adverseness often present issue which
remain unfocused because they are not pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question
emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a
multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests . .
40 See generally Victor F. Comella, Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Structures
and Institutional Designs: The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some Thoughts on
Judicial Activism, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1705 (2004).
41 See id.
42 See, e.g., Nicolas M. Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an American Perspective,
12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 58, 78-79 (1994).
43 Apart from ruling on individual constitutional complaints, the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) hears cases in so called abstract review procedure. A law passed by the federal legislative
may be brought before the court by certain political institutions if they consider it unconstitutional. Moreover, while
deciding a case, if any regular court doubts constitutionality of the applicable law, it must suspend that case and bring this
law before the Federal Constitutional Court. See Danielle E. Finck, Judicial Review: The United States Supreme Court
Versus the German Constitutional Court, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 123, 147 (1997).
4 Court of Justice of the European Union gives preliminary rulings concerning interpretation of the EU
Treaties. National courts and tribunals may request the European Court of Justice for advice regarding interpretation of the
community law, if they consider that question to be necessary to enable it to give judgment (references for a preliminary
ruling). It is mandatory for a national court of last resort to submit any such question to the Court of Justice for preliminary
ruling. See The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 267, May 9, 2008, O.J. (C 115/47), available at
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extending far beyond process. One has only to look at Bush v. Gore45 for an illustration of how
putatively neutral constitutional adjudication can be warped by the presence of adversarial parties
with an economic, political and social interest in the outcome.46
2. Not Only Are the Gladiators Far From Equal in Resources, the Rules of the Playing Field
Itself are Biased in Favor of Those in Power
A vivid example of how principles of constitutional standing are themselves obstacles to
any challenge to the constitutionality of a governmental policy is provided by the Supreme Court
case City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.47 Adolph Lyons was a young black man stopped by the police
for having a burned out taillight on his car. When the police shoved his hands above his head, his
keys cut into his hand and he complained. The police then used a chokehold that rendered him
unconscious. When he awoke, he was spitting blood and in pain. He had also urinated and
defecated. He was issued a traffic citation and released. He later learned that sixteen individuals,
mostly black men, had died from the use of the chokehold by Los Angeles police officers. Lyons
sued for both money damages and injunctive relief to prevent the use of the chokehold except
where necessary to protect the officers' safety. This particular procedure was an official policy of
the Los Angeles police department. 4 8
The Supreme Court dismissed his claim for an injunction on standing grounds, holding
that he was not entitled to seek an injunction because he could not demonstrate that he was likely
to be choked again in the future. 4 9 Justice White, writing for the majority, explained, Lyons'
"standing to seek the injunction requested depended on whether he [specifically] was likely to
suffer future injury from the use of the chokeholds by police officers. 5 0 The Court concluded that
"[a]bsent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way, Lyons is no more
entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles; and a federal court may not
entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law
enforcement officers are unconstitutional."
The case's outcome begs the question of who can possibly meet the standing
requirements of a "case or controversy" with the L.A. police department if an individual who has
been choked as the result of an established policy of the L.A. police cannot. The irony is that the
United States legal system relies on adversarial challenges to fix constitutional wrongs, but
creates barriers that unreasonably foreclose such challenges, particularly for those litigants who
52
otherwise have the least political, economic or other social power and resources.
http://eurlex.europa.eu.
45 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, (2000) (deciding the winner of the 2000 U.S. presidential election).
46 See, e.g., Charles G. Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal Political and Economic
Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. R. 96 (1923); Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960).
47 See generally City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
48 Id. at 97-98.
49 Id. at 113.
5o Id. at 105.
5' Id. at 111.
52 See Lujan v. Defenders, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing For Privilege: The Failure of
Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 333 (2002). ("Anomalously, the power to trigger judicial review is afforded most
readily to those who have traditionally enjoyed the greatest access to the processes of democratic government. The white
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3. The Restricted Lack of Judicial Review to Challenge the Status Quo under the Equal
Protection Clause
Another implication of the unique American adversarial approach to constitutional
adjudication can be vividly seen in Equal Protection jurisprudence. The Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution provides that all individuals shall be entitled to the "equal
protection of the laws." 53 The Clause, by its terms, would seem to mitigate much of the problems
of unequal legal power engendered by the adversarial system. For much of the Clause's life,
however, the courts have simply ignored its existence. For example, the Supreme Court of the
United States first determined in 1873 that the Clause only applied to recently emancipated
African Americans.54 Then, in 1896, the Supreme Court essentially determined that even blatant
discrimination against recently emancipated African Americans did not constitute a violation of
the Clause.
It wasn't until 1944, in Korematsu v. United States,56 addressing the internment of
Japanese-American citizens, that the Supreme Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause in
any meaningful way by applying a heightened level of scrutiny to discriminatory laws or
governmental action; even in that case, the internment of the Japanese-Americans was found not
to violate the constitution.
In these later interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court based its
heightened scrutiny on a footnote in an earlier case, U.S. v. Carolene Products. The footnote
suggested that the Equal Protection Clause only requires heightened scrutiny of particular
legislation when that legislation (1) "restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation ... ; (2) targets minorities that,
because of prejudice, are unable to avail themselves of "those political processes ordinarily to be
,,59 60
relied upon to protect minorities... . ; or (3) a specific Constitutional right. In other words,
voters in Shaw, the white contractor in Northeastern Florida, and (most pointedly) George W. Bush fit no comprehensible
vision of excluded minorities or historically victimized groups. Minority plaintiffs, poor litigants, unwed mothers, black
prisoners, and indigent patients get the harshest treatment in injury law. Their burdens are higher, their barriers more
substantial. They must prove greater consequential harms, must show closer causation links, and must surmount greater
redressability hurdles. Article III determinations are driven neither by text nor history. They favor the powerful. They
disadvantage the powerless."); Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405,
1472 (2000).
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
54 Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73-74 (1873) ("The next observation is more important in view of the
arguments of counsel in the present case. It is, that the distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship
of a State is clearly recognized and established . . . It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and
a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or
circumstances in the individual. We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this amendment of great weight in
this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section, which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error,
speaks only of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those of citizens of the
several States. The argument, however, in favor of the plaintiffs, rests wholly on the assumption that the citizenship is the
same and the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the clause are the same.").
55 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 547 (1896).
56 Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 220-224 (1944)
57 U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
58 Id.
59 Id.
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the mandate of equal protection, which presumably applies to all persons, is only applicable
through heightened scrutiny of unfavorable legislation when a particular party is deemed unable
to wage battle in the political systems to protect its own rights. Although limited in its scope, the
more recent equal protection theoretical approach appeared, at first blush, to be a perfect means of
remedying some of the problems of an unequal playing field.
Nevertheless, the benefits to politically weak or underfunded groups or minorities have
been uneven. Although relatively recent applications of the Equal Protection Clause did
ultimately result in the end of de jure legal segregation,61 and certain kinds of formal
discrimination against certain groups,62 even those gains have been recently curtailed.63 Perhaps,
most importantly for the purposes of this article, the Court has been unwilling to squarely address
the issue of inequality in the judicial forum through application of the Equal Protection Clause.
The heightened scrutiny that has been extended to some historical victims of discrimination has
not been extended to those literally without equal power in the adversarial forum: those without
wealth or the means to otherwise adequately defend themselves against clearly stronger
adversaries.64 Moreover, in addition to lack of wealth not being a category that triggers
heightened scrutiny, those without the means to fight in the political or judicial process are also
handicapped by the limitation on the fundamental rights that are protected by the Equal Protection
Clause.
As discussed above, the theoretical analysis in Carolene Products footnote 4 provides the
rationale for judicial intervention to protect those less able to protect themselves. It also, however,
suggests that heightened scrutiny may apply when the right involved is deemed fundamental
and/or is a specific Constitutional right. Such a right includes those rights essential for groups to
"fight" in the political process to vindicate their interests, such as voting,65 but the court has been
6 Id. ("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.")
61 Brown v. Board of Ed. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold
that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition
makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
62 Newport News v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (case involving the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
against woman and their employers); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (ruling that although women are citizens,
they cannot vote).
63 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (involving the repeal of Section (b) of Voting
Rights Act); see also Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (wherein the
Court struck down voluntary efforts by the Seattle and Louisville School districts to desegregate their districts). Seattle
School District resulted in the anomalous situation that a remedy for segregated schools that would have been
constitutionally required by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was essentially ruled unconstitutional by
the Court. See Breyer, J., dissenting at 868. ("The last half-century has witnessed great strides toward racial equality, but
we have not yet realized the promise of Brown. To invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise of Brown.
The plurality's position, I fear, would break that promise. This is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come to
regret.")
6 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARv. L. REV. 747, 790-791 (2011) (citing San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1973)).
65 But see Holder, supra note 64, wherein this protection was sharply curtailed.
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unwilling to extend this fundamental rights analysis beyond the most egregious and formalistic
violations of those rights. Consistent with the American belief that a battle or struggle is the
principal means of achieving one's goals or rights, the discussion below speaks to how the Court
has been particularly unwilling to extend this concept of fundamental rights to "substantive
outcomes"66 of wealth such as housing or health care.67 Presumably, the greater the redistribution
of substantive outcomes, the less incentive there would be for people to earn more money.
To some extent, this argument is consistent with a free market economy where
accumulation of wealth is viewed as essential and desirable. It is also arguably consistent with an
American belief in "equality of opportunity" but not "equality of result."68 But, as discussed
below, the United States has taken this position to the extreme, viewing health care as a good that
can be purchased based on financial ability, the same as other goods, even though it arguably can
involve an issue of life or death.
Nevertheless, as discussed below, the Court has been internally inconsistent in denying
equal access to education, which is the very tool that individuals use to overcome their inequality
of birth, and obtain equality of opportunity, a concept that is the bedrock of the "American
Dream." 69
D. Education
Education can be viewed as a necessary tool for participation in the procedural battle in
the United States for certain "end results" or particular "substantive outcomes" such as allocation
of resources. 70 As opposed to being a particular "good" that individuals in an economically
competitive society can be expected to acquire in greater "quantities," education can be viewed as
a necessary tool with which a party can fight for her or his desired substantive outcome.n This
distinction is subtle, but critically important. Because education is itself essential to engaging in
the adversarial battle for resources under the established rules of combat, there is a strong
argument for characterizing education as a fundamental right rather than the ambiguous non-
fundamental status it "enjoys" today.72 Indeed, not characterizing education as a fundamental
66 The authors define "substantive outcomes" as involving goods, the purchase of which is dependent on
wealth, such as cars, homes, etc.
67 See discussion infra at Part 2(e)(1) and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 1227 (1973) (speaking to the equality of an educational opportunity in poor school districts, specifically in Texas);
Ashley Feasley, The Dream Act and the Right to Equal Educational Opportunity: An Analysis of U.S. and International
Human Rights Frameworks as they Relate to Education Rights, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 68 (2011) (analyzing the DREAM
Act as it relates to opportunity in the U.S. and the "American Dream").
69 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (finding that the argument in
which education is a fundamental right or liberty unpersuasive, and "while education is one of the most important services
performed by the state, it is not among rights afforded explicit or implicit protection under the Federal Constitution").
70 See generally Stephen Lurie, Why Doesn't The Constitution Guarantee the Right to Education?, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2013),http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/why-doesnt-the-constitution-guarantee-
the-right-to-education/280583/ [https//perma.cc/4ZWC-QBAF].
7' Id.
72 Other rights, such as the right to vote, are deemed fundamental precisely because they are essential to
participation in political society; indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the right to vote is fundamental.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 872 (3d ed. 2006). In Reynolds v. Sims, the
Court stated "[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
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right is internally inconsistent with America's view of itself as bestowing equality of opportunity,
as opposed to equality of result or allocation of goods. Without even rough equality of education,
there cannot even be equality of opportunity.
The Court's struggle with whether to characterize education as fundamental or non-
fundamental is presumably precisely because it contains these characteristics of a procedure rather
than a "good" which could be expected to be purchased in greater quantity and quality by richer
individuals. For example, in Plyler v. Doe,73 a case involving the complete denial by a state of
educational benefits to children of undocumented aliens, the Supreme Court refused to recognize
education as a fundamental right, but it did apply an ambiguously higher level of scrutiny than
mere rational basis. The Court appeared to recognize that education was a necessary prerequisite
for competing in an adversarial society, but could not bring itself to reconcile the inherent
contradiction in endorsing a system of competition at all levels of society while simultaneously
endorsing equal access to the means to effectively compete.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell explicitly stated "[o]ur review in a case such as
this is properly heightened." The Court emphasized the importance of education for developing
76in children the capability of meaningfully participating in civic institutions. Justice Blackmun
elaborated on this concept in his concurring opinion, where he stated "[i]n a sense, then, denial of
an education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the former relegates the individual to
second-class social status; the latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage"7 7
(emphasis added). Indeed, a consistent theme in the jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution is that courts will only intervene to undo unequal legislative
outcomes (if at all) if one party has suffered a procedural disadvantage. This decision
exemplifies the idea that education may have more of a relationship to established "procedural"
rights such as voting than to, for example, medical care, which may be viewed by some courts as
a substantive benefit itself.
In San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 79 the Court refused to recognize education as a fundamental
right. In this case, where one poorer school district spent $356 per pupil and a wealthier district
spent $594 per pupil (as a result of the Texas system of funding public schools through local
property taxes), the Court noted that the students in the poorer district were not being denied an
education, and applied rational basis scrutiny.8 0 This decision exemplifies the Court's
unwillingness to apply heightened concern for procedural fairness, as opposed to substantive
fairness.
What is critical in the American jurisprudential approach to specific rights is not their
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). The Court has
declared the right to vote as fundamental because it is the "preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886). The ability to participate in the political process is seen by the Court as paramount to other rights. See
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) ("Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.").
73 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 8.
74 Plyler, supra note 74, at 224.
7 Id. at 238.
76 Id. at 224
7 Id. at 234.
78 See Equal Protection discussion, supra Part 2, 3 and accompanying text.
7 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
so Id. at 39.
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importance in a general sense. Rather, what is important is the specific right's procedural value.
Despite the courts' appreciation of the importance of education in the creation of equality of
opportunity (versus outcome), the Court has not been willing to consider education a fundamental
right, although the Court's jurisprudence on this issue has been subject to heated internal debate.8 1
Part of the reason for this heated debate is the internal contradiction it reflects about American
jurisprudence in general. American jurisprudence claims to value procedural fairness over
equality of result, yet ultimately is unwilling to modify procedural aspects of society sufficiently
to fulfill that claimed goal or value. Some would call it hypocrisy; a legal realist might
characterize it as deliberate deception to ensure the preservation of the socio-economic status quo
under the illusion of equality of opportunity. Others would argue that even the idea of procedural
equality has limits imposed by budgetary or other constraints.
1. A Comparative View of Education as a Fundamental Right
The United States approach to education is markedly different from that found in other
countries, which have been much more willing to recognize education as a fundamental right. 82
These provisions are usually contained in the Constitutions of those countries, ensuring that the
right to an education is recognized as a fundamental and irrevocable right. These rights are
SI See generally id. at 71 (affirming that education is not a fundamental right). Justice Marshall's dissent is
an example of the debate over the place of education in an individual's spectrum of rights. He states:
More unfortunately, though, the majority's holding can only be seen as a retreat from our historic
commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as unsupportable acquiescence in a system
which deprives children in their earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens.
The Court does this despite the absence of any substantial justification for a scheme which
arbitrarily channels educational resources in accordance with the fortuity of the amount of taxable
wealth within each district. In my judgment, the right of every American to an equal start in life, so
far as the provision of a state service as important as education is concerned, is far too vital to
permit state discrimination on grounds as tenuous as those presented by this record. Nor can I
accept the notion that it is sufficient to remit these appellees to the vagaries of the political process
which, contrary to the majority's suggestion, has proved singularly unsuited to the task of providing
a remedy for this discrimination. Id. at 70-71.
See also Kadrmas v. Dickenson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (reaffirming that education is not a fundamental
right). Where a state law authorized local school systems charging a fee for the use of school buses, the Court once again
justified the use of rational basis review because education was not being denied. Id. at 463.
S2 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF ALBANIA, Nov. 28, 1998, art. 57 ("Everyone has a right to education.");
FINLANDS GRUNDLAG [CONSTITUTION], 1999 (rev. 2011), ch. 2, sec. 16 [Fin.] ("Everyone has the right to basic education
free of charge."); REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION], 1974, ch. 2 art. 21 (Swed.) ("All children covered by
compulsory education have the right to a free basic education in a public school. The public administration shall also
ensure the availability of higher education."); GRUNDLOVEN [CONSTITUTION], 1953, sec. 76 (Den.) ("All children of
school age shall be entitled to free instruction in the elementary schools."); THE CONSTITUTION OF ICELAND, 1999, art. 76
("The right to general education and suitable training shall by law be guaranteed to all."). See also Right to Education
Project, Module - Privatisation and the Right to Education (2014), http://www.right-to-education.org/sites/right-to-
education.org/files/resource-
attachments/RTETrainingModulePrivatisationandtheRighttoEducationNotes_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9MWL-48AE].
83 See generally, Stephen Lurie, Why Doesn't The Constitution Guarantee the Right to Education?, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/why-doesnt-the-constitution-guarantee-
the-right-to-education/280583/ [https://perma.cc/BK5M-RZJ9].
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frequently termed "positive" in that they are obligations that government owes the people, 84
requiring the government to fulfill a duty. 85
2. The Divergent Approach of the United States and its Root in the Philosophical
Underpinnings of American society.
This approach to fundamental rights is all the more important in a society that has
experienced such marked economic, political, and social inequality as the United States. Much of
the unique history of the United States with respect to race is documented in the Brown
University Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice (the "Brown Report") discussing, inter alia,
the University's founders' involvement in the slave trade.86 As noted by the Brown Report:
If American slavery has any claims to being historically "peculiar," its peculiarity lay in
its rigorous racialism, the systematic way in which racial ideas were used to demean and
deny the humanity of people of even partial African descent. This historical legacy
would make the process of incorporating the formerly enslaved as citizens far more
problematic in the United States than in other New World slave societies.
The United States was perhaps unique in the history of the world in its racialization of
slavery. As noted by the Brown Report, "Few if any societies in history carried this logic further
than the United States, where people of African descent came to be regarded as a distinct 'race' of
persons, fashioned by nature for hard labor." 88 This unique aspect of American history has
particular implications for the peculiarly American emphasis on procedural "equality" over
"substantive result." Most Americans believe that American society ought to, and in general does,
guarantee equality of opportunity to succeed but not equality of results. 89 As Imoukhuede noted:
Social inequality is justified as the necessary result of a free market competition amongst
individuals. Of course, for a free market to be truly free, there must exist a means of
assuring that everyone is similarly equipped to engage in a fair and equal competition.
Otherwise, free market competition alone cannot serve as a moral justification for the
coexistence of poverty alongside enormous wealth. 90
84 See Helen Hershkoff, "JUST WORDS": Common Law and The Enforcement Of State Constitutional
Social And Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1540 (2010); Curt Bentley, Constrained By The Liberal Tradition:
Why The Supreme Court Has Not Found Positive Rights In The American Constitution, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1721, 1721
(2007); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
1293, 1326 (1984).
85 See Hershkoff, supra note 85, at 1540; Bentley, supra note 85, at 1721; Kreimer, supra note 85, at 1326.
86 "Slavery and Justice," BROWN UNIVERSITY STEERING COMMITTEE ON SLAVERY AND JUSTICE at 8.
http://www.brown.edu/ResearchlSlaveryJustice/documents/SlaveryAndJustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LL4-T2Q5]
(hereafter, "Brown Report").
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See supra Part II.C.3.
9o Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide Public Education, 22 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 45, 46 (2011).
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Logically, in order to make the argument that equality of opportunity trumps equality of
results, there must first exist a genuine opportunity for every individual to "develop his [or her]
talents to their full potential - unhampered by arbitrary barriers of race or birth or income."91 This
is particularly true when in many cases those barriers were not arbitrary at all, but the result of
deliberate governmental policy intentionally discriminating against groups of people in what
would now be recognized as a violation of constitutional and international law. 92
As Imoukhuede states in the Fifth Freedom, it follows that an adequate education is a
prerequisite for any semblance of fair competition in a free market because, in order for any
competition to be equal or fair there must exist a means of assuring that everyone is similarly
equipped. 93 The meritocratic effects of intergenerational privilege must be equalized for there to
be a semblance of equal opportunity that can begin to justify unequal results and pervasive social
inequality. 9 4
Nevertheless, under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, education is merely subject to a
rational basis test, which is the weakest protection afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment. 95
Despite its obvious importance in justifying the uniquely American economic system and
democracy, education has not been deemed a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution.96
This would seem to support the legal realist position that it is not the purpose of the system to
guarantee equality of opportunity, or procedural equality, but simply to guarantee the current
hierarchy of economic privilege. 97
Without a right to public education, which President Lyndon B. Johnson referred to as
the fifth freedom, 98 there is no equal opportunity for those born to less wealthy, less privileged
91 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Education: The Fifth Freedom
(February 5, 1968) (Presidential Papers, 54); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education").
9' See, e.g. National Park Service, Brown v. Board: Five Communities that Changed America, TEACHING
WITH HISTORIC PLACES LESSON PLAN, (Aug. 5, 2012) http://www.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/121brown
/121locatel.htm [https://perma.cc/BJZ3-2LEJ] (citing Richard Kluger, SIMPLE JUSTICE 327 (New York Vintage Books,
1977), and Jeffrey A. Raffel, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND DESEGREGATION: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 86 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998)) (In the early 1950s, the following seventeen states required
racial segregation in public schools: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Four
other states, Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico, and Wyoming permitted segregation in public schools if local communities
wanted it). Of course, segregation of schools enabled unequal funding of schools based on their enrollment without
affecting the elected representatives in states in which African-Americans were effectively denied the franchise.
93 Imoukhuede, supra note 91 at 46.
94 See id. Compare Ann I. Park, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms
to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1205-06 (1987) ("[t]he prevailing view is that human
welfare is best guaranteed by the 'free market,' which offers infinite economic opportunity to provide for the well-being of
all Americans, if only people would exert themselves properly. However, the myth of equal economic opportunity is
belied by the demographic reality"); See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40; Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1159 (1999) ("any reasonably conceivable state of facts... could
provide a rational basis for the classification").
96 See generally Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
97 See id. at Part B.
98 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Education: The Fifth Freedom
(February 5, 1968) (Presidential Papers, 54).
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families. 99 Public education is a means by which government ensures that all people enter the
market with the foundational tools to compete without handicap or unfair disadvantage arising
from the intergenerational effects of wealth that lie outside an individual's control. 100
The current rule of no fundamental right to education flows from a profound confusion
regarding fundamental rights as duties. 101 Negative rights function as bars to government
actions 102 that either discriminate against a protected class or infringe upon protected conduct.
The failure to recognize The Fifth Freedom as a fundamental positive right, has created a major
inconsistency in U.S. constitutional law so that U.S. fundamental rights doctrine is clearly out of
step with broader understandings of social justice,103 or even the theoretical basis upon which
American society is based: equality of opportunity.
It could be argued that the peculiarly adversarial, libertarian approach to issue and
dispute resolution results not in spite of the American history of gross inequality but because of it.
It is precisely because Americans begin life in extraordinary unequal situations that the legal,
economic and political elites have a vested interest in ensuring that the hierarchy of privileges
remain intact. Arguably, in a homogenous society, a privileged member of society is more likely
to look sympathetically upon fellow citizens of unfortunate circumstances. It is possible that the
diversity of the United States contributes to its reluctance to extend equality of opportunity to all
its citizens. Even in areas such as education. In this sense, the issue of equality of opportunity in
education is vastly greater than simply the issue of race.
Thomas Jefferson and other founding fathers of the U.S. wrote official declarations and
papers that espoused a civic philosophy that public education is essential to a democracy.104 They
espoused normative arguments favoring public education. 10 As noted previously, international
human rights conventions and treaties also present normative justifications for public education as
an international human right.106 This indicates strong foundational support for the right to public
9 President Johnson announced that freedom from ignorance ought to be added to FDR's list of essential
human freedoms as the fifth freedom. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Education: The
Fifth Freedom (February 5, 1968) (Presidential Papers, 54).
100 Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public
Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1355-56 (2004) (discussing the best way to obtain education results is when
disadvantaged children are placed in a wealthier school).
101 But see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17-18 (holding there is no fundamental right to education under
Constitution).
102 Sotirios A. Barber, Fallacies of Negative Constitutionalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 651, 651 (2006)
("The negative view sees the Constitution as a set of institutions for transforming popular preferences into law in a manner
consistent with constitutional rights. This negative constitutionalism sees constitutional rights as exemptions from
governmental power, exemptions it calls negative liberties; it emphasizes private rights over public purposes.").
103 Contra Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17-18, 29-30 (holding there is no fundamental right to education under
the Constitution. It did so using the language of negative rights. However, even as the Court failed to recognize a
fundamental right, it simultaneously upheld existing precedent that recognized government's special duty to provide
public education).
104 See 2 EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 739-740 (Sol Cohen ed., 1974).
1os See id. [hereinafter EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES]; U.N. Charter pmbl., ¶ 2, 4 (describing the duty
of the state to promote its citizens" higher standards of living and fundamental freedoms); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 26 (Dec. 10, 1948) (U.N. non-binding resolution declaring, among other things, that the
right to public education is a human right).
106 See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 26; International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 13; Ann I. Park, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights
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education as well as an obligation under international law to fulfill the basic human right to public
education. 107
Thomas Jefferson's several writings on the subject of public education and his Virginia
"Bill for the General Diffusion of Knowledge" of 1779, demonstrated his educational philosophy
that children should not be deprived of an education simply because they come from poor
families, osJefferson believed that society had a duty to educate children who could not afford
education but had a demonstrated superior intellectual ability at the common expense, 109 He
indicated a need for broad public involvement in funding public education. 110 Samuel Knox's call
regarding education is by comparison even broader as he explicitly called for the broadest form of
public involvement in education.
Samuel Knox's 1799 writing, "An Essay on the Best System of Liberal Education
Adapted to the Genius of the Government of the United States" was perhaps the earliest call for a
national system of education in America. 112 Knox recognized that given the size of the U.S., it
would be difficult to establish a system capable of affording education equally to every individual
in the nation.113 He analogized those difficulties with difficulties in forming a national
government and concluded that such difficulties ought not to detract from the goal of a national
education system.114 "It does not appear more impracticable to establish an uniform system of
national education, than a system of legislation or civil government."1 1 5
Under the more contemporary philosophy of John Dewey, the ultimate aim of society
ought not be the mere production of goods, but the production of free human beings associated
with one another on terms of equality.116 Formal education has become increasingly important as
the scope of resources, achievements, and responsibilities in society has grown more complex. 117
No longer can children get by with a mere three years of formal basic education and from there go
on to apprentice themselves to adults. Education is a necessity of life for Dewey because, "what
nutrition and reproduction are to physiological life, education is to social life" - a means of
sustaining and perpetuating that which makes us human.11 8 In order to have an all-encompassing,
Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1221 (1987); O.A.S. Charter, art. 47 & 49.
107 See id.
108 A Virginia bill, sponsored by Thomas Jefferson, that called for a school system subsidized by the state.
See THOMAS JEFFERSON, BILL FOR THE MORE GENERAL DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE (1779), in 2 EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 739 (Sol Cohen ed., 1974).
109 Id. at 40
110 Id.
" See SAMUEL KNox, AN ESSAY ON THE BEST SYSTEM OF LIBERAL EDUCATION ADAPTED TO THE GENIUS
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1799), in 2 EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 776 (Sol Cohen ed., 1974).
112 Id. at 778-80.
113 Id. at 779.
114 Id.
''s Id.
116 See generally JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1967).
1' Id. at 8.
118 Id. at 9; see also Ann I. Park, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms
to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1196 n.1 (1987) ("[B]asic human needs ... refer to the
fundamental requirements of food, shelter, medical care, and education. Although education may not intuitively seem
necessary to the sustenance of life, the concept of 'basic needs,' as applied in development literature, commonly includes
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interested deliberation, society needs a well-educated citizenry. We would argue, however, that
there is more to the state's role in providing education than simply preparing its young citizens to
govern themselves. Rather, we would argue that the state's purpose is not only to safeguard
liberty, but also to provide the basic tools by which individuals may fully develop their
capabilities. 119
E. Health Care
Another manifestation of the gladiatorial approach of the United States political,
economic and legal systems is illustrated by the unique American approach to the provision of
health care. 120 Whereas under international law and in most of the industrialized world, health
care is viewed as a fundamental right, 121 and thus not subject to individual negotiation between
buyer and seller characteristic of the provision of ordinary goods in a free market, there is
considerable legal, political, and economic debate in the United States over whether health care
should be considered a fundamental right. 122 Health care, after all, ultimately determines whether
an individual lives or dies. However, it would seem inconsistent with the American system of
adversarial dispute resolution and reliance on adversarial negotiation to recognize health care as a
fundamental right, since health care is arguably an "end product good" and thus not an essential
tool in the battle for rights or to obtain specific "substantive outcomes."123 This would distinguish
health care from such recognized fundamental rights as participation in the political process,
access to the courts, or right to counsel in certain circumstances, however imperfectly these
fundamental rights have been actually implemented by the courts.
1. A Comparative View of Health Care as a Fundamental Right
In Europe and many other countries, health care is generally considered a fundamental
education as one of the five basic needs of human beings.").
"1 Id.; see also AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2011);
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES 17-18, 32-33, 77-79 (2011). See also DEWEY, supra note 117, at 183.
120 See Robert A. Kagan, Review Symposium on Kagan's Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of
Law: On Surveying the Whole Legal Forest, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 833, 836 (2003).
121 See e.g. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 35, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 2 ("Everyone
has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions
established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and
implementation of all Union policies and activities."); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
art. 12 § 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 8 (provides that the signatories "recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health."); European Social Charter, art. 11, Oct. 18, 1961, E.T.S.
35 ("With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection of health, the Parties undertake, either directly
or in cooperation with public or private organisations, to take appropriate measures designed inter alia: 1. to remove as far
as possible the causes of ill-health; 2. to provide advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of health and the
encouragement of individual responsibility in matters of health; 3. to prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and
other diseases.").
122 See e.g., Anita B. Pereira, Live and Let Live: Healthcare is a Fundamental Human Right, 3 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 481 (2004); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1325, 1327 (2010).
123 See supra text accompanying note 67.
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right.124 The European public health policy is reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union, Article 35, which provides: "Everyone has the right of access to preventive
health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by
national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the
definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities."125 The rationale for
considering health care a fundamental right in international law and most national law descends
directly from the protection of life as one of the most important of human rights, rather than
merely an economic activity.126 Just to provide a small sampling, constitutional provisions
recognizing health care as the equivalent of a fundamental right can be found in the constitutions
of Belgium, 12 Estonia, 12 Finland,129 France,130 Hungary,131 Italy, Latvia,133 Lithuania,134
Luxembourg,135 The Netherlands,136 Poland,137 Russia,138 Slovakia, 139 Slovenia,140 and Spain.141
124 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 122; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 122; European Social Charter, supra note 122.
125 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 122.
126 See David Leonhardt, A Lesson From Europe on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/18/business/18leonhardt.html [https://perma.cc/LS7W-GZMM] ("[W]e talk about
medical spending as if it were nothing more than a drag on the economy, rather than an investment in the most important
thing of all: our well-being.").
127 LA CONSTITUTION, art. 23 (Belg.) (" 1. Everyone has the right to lead a life in conformity with human
dignity. 2. To this end, the laws, decrees, and rulings alluded to in Article 134 guarantee, taking into account
corresponding obligations, economic, social, and cultural rights, and determine the conditions for exercising them. 3.
These rights include notably: . . . the right to social security, to health care and to social, medical, and legal aid.").
128 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA, July 3, 1992, art. 28 ("Everyone has the right to the
protection of health ") EST. CONST. art. 28.
129 LA CONSTITUTION OF FINLAND, June 11, 1999, §19 ("The public authorities shall guarantee for
everyone, as provided in more detail by an Act, adequate social, health and medical services and promote the health of the
population.").
130 CONSTITUTION OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, Oct. 27, 1946, Preamble. ("[The Nation] shall guarantee
everyone, particularly children, mothers and older workers, health protection, material security, rest and leisure. Any
human being who is unable to work because of his age, his physical or mental condition or his financial situation, shall
have the right to obtain the appropriate means for living from the community.").
131 THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY 1949, ch. XII, art. 70/D, ("(1) Everyone living in the territory of
the Republic of Hungary has the right to the highest possible level of physical and mental health. (2) The Republic of
Hungary shall implement this right through institutions of labor safety and health care, through the organization of medical
care and the opportunities for regular physical activity, as well as through the protection of the urban and natural
environment.").
132 Art. 32 Costituzione (It.) ("The Republic shall protect the health as a basic right of the individual and as
an interest of the community, and shall grant free medical care to the poor.")
133 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA, art. 111 ("The State shall protect human health and
guarantee a basic level of medical assistance for everyone.").
134 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, art. 53 ("The State shall look after the health of the
people and shall guarantee medical aid and services for the human being in the event of sickness. The procedure for
providing medical aid to citizens free of charge at State medical establishments shall be established by law.").
135 CONSTITUTION OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG, art. 11 ("The law organizes the social security,
health protection, and rest of workers and guarantee the freedom of trade unions.").
136 STATUUT NED, art. 22 (Neth.) ("The authorities shall take steps to promote the health of the
population.").
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In these countries, the right to health care is commonly understood as a right to the enjoyment of a
variety of goods and services necessary for pursuing the "highest attainable standard" of health.142
Thus, at a practical level, healthcare is provided on a free or low-cost basis to the entire
population, where single individuals can still decide to undertake medical treatment in private
facilities.
2. The Roots of This Divergence Between the United States and the Rest of the
Industrialized World with Respect to Health Care.
It is the belief of many in the U.S.,143 and it is consistent with America's philosophical
underpinnings, that individuals should have to "work" for their healthcare, just as they have to
work for other commodities, services and "substantive outcomes" in their life.144 Americans earn
healthcare as an end product of their economic battle to succeed, and their political and social
battle to consolidate and further those economic gains.
Consistent with this belief, the Supreme Court has been very reluctant to expand the
137 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 68, provides: "1. Everyone shall have the right to
have his health protected. 2. Equal access to health care services, financed from public funds, shall be ensured by public
authorities to citizens, irrespective of their material situation. The conditions for, and scope of, the provision of services
shall be established by statute. 3. Public authorities shall ensure special health care to children, pregnant women,
handicapped people and persons of advanced age. 4. Public authorities shall combat epidemic illnesses and prevent the
negative health consequences of degradation of the environment. 5. Public authorities shall support the development of
physical culture, particularly amongst children and young persons." POL. CONST. art. 68
138 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 41, provides that: "1. Everyone shall have the right
to health care and medical assistance. Medical assistance shall be made available by state and municipal health care
institutions to citizens free of charge, with the money from the relevant budget, insurance payments and other revenues. 2.
The Russian Federation shall finance federal health care and health-building programs, take measures to develop state,
municipal and private health care systems, encourage activities contributing to the strengthening of the man's health, to the
development of physical culture and sport, and to ecological, sanitary and epidemiologic welfare . . . " Russ. CONST. Art.
41.
139 Constitution of the Slovak Republic, Article 20, provides that: "(1) Everyone shall have the right to own
property. Property rights of all owners shall be uniformly construed and equally protected by law. The right of inheritance
is guaranteed. (2) The law shall establish certain property, which is necessary for the purposes of safeguarding the needs of
the society, the development of the national economy and the public interest, except the property defined in Art. 4 of this
Constitution as the exclusive property of the State, the municipality or specific legal persons. A law may also lay down
which property only individual citizens or legal persons residing in the Slovak Republic may own." SLOVK. CONST. art.
20.
140 Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Article 51, provides that: "Everyone has the right to health care
under conditions provided by law. The rights to health care from public funds shall be provided by law. No one may be
compelled to undergo medical treatment except in cases provided by law." SLOVN. CONST. art. 51.
141 Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain, Article 43, provides that: "1. The right to health protection is
recognized. 2. It is incumbent upon the public authorities to organize and watch over public health by means of preventive
measures and the necessary benefits and services. The law shall establish the rights and duties of all in this respect."
SPAIN CONST. art. 43.
142 Pereira, supra note 123, at 486-87.
143 See Gallup, Healthcare System (Apr. 15, 2017), http://www.gallup.com/poll/4708/healthcare-
system.aspx [https://perma.cc/2L9H-TEJT].
144 See supra text accompanying note 67.
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scope of fundamental rights to rights that would implicate "substantive outcomes." 145 As a result,
although the right to health care is recognized by the international community in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the same right is arguably implicit in the Constitution's
Preamble as requiring the federal government to take affirmative steps to secure the "Blessings of
Liberty,"146 health care has never received constitutional protection.
As a matter of law, there are three main arguments rooted in American law that support
such a belief. First, the U.S. Constitution does not expressly recognize the right to health care.147
Second, the federal Constitution protects individual liberties and freedoms from government
intrusion rather than imposing governmental duties or obligations.148 Third, the Tenth
Amendment is generally construed as reserving the power to regulate health, safety, and welfare
to the states, which can better define and address the different health care needs of their
residents. 149
An explanation for this divergence between the United States and much of the rest of the
world is provided by N. Gregory Mankiw:
The push for universal coverage is based on the appealing premise that everyone should
have access to the best health care possible whenever they need it. That soft-hearted
aspiration, however, runs into the hardheaded reality that state-of-the-art health care is
increasingly expensive. At some point, someone in the system has to say there are some
things we will not pay for. The big question is, who? The government? Insurance
companies? Or consumers themselves? And should the answer necessarily be the same
for everyone?
Inequality in economic resources is a natural but not altogether attractive feature of
a free society. As health care becomes an ever larger share of the economy, we will have
no choice but to struggle with the questions of how far we should allow such inequality
to extend and what restrictions on our liberty we should endure in the name of
fairness.
Economics professor Walter E. Williams of George Mason University writes of the right
to health care as violative of the American conception of rights in general:
True rights, such as those in our Constitution, or those considered to be natural or human
rights, exist simultaneously among people. That means exercise of a right by one person
does not diminish those held by another. In other words, my rights to speech or travel
impose no obligations on another except those of non-interference. If we apply ideas
behind rights to health care to my rights to speech or travel, my free speech rights would
require government-imposed obligations on others to provide me with an auditorium,
145 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
146 U.S. CONST., preamble.
147 Leonard, supra note 123, at 1328.
148 Id. at 1328.
149 Id.
15o Robert M. Beren, Ph.D., Why Health Care Will Never Be Equal, NY TIMES (Sept. 19, 2009), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/health/policy/20view.html.
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television studio or radio station. My right to travel freely would require government-
imposed obligations on others to provide me with airfare and hotel accommodations. 151
Thus, making health care a fundamental right would arguably violate the underlying
American presumption of non-governmental interference in substantive outcomes based upon
each individual's competitive abilities in the national and presumably global marketplace. As
appears evident from American jurisprudence, American courts will only intervene in the
allocation of benefits if fundamental rights or a suspect class 152 is involved, and only then will it
do so reluctantly.153
It could be argued that incapacitating diseases and critical illness may completely impair
the opportunity of a person to exercise any of his or her rights, including the most protected and
fundamental right to vote. According to one commentator, Roosevelt himself believed the Second
Bill of Rights should provide that each person had the right to health care.154
F. The Unique American Adversarial Approach to Freedom of Expression
1. American Divergence from International Law and Other Countries in its Adversarial
Approach to Hate Speech.
Few areas of constitutional adjudication better exemplify the particularly
adversarial/gladiatorial view of issue resolution than in the areas of regulation of speech, particularly
regulation of "hate speech." 1 55 Expression is usually considered to constitute hate speech when it is
directed at individuals because of their membership in certain groups and is "abusive, insulting,
intimidating, harassing and/or which incites to violence, hatred or discrimination."156 This article does
not attempt to judge whether the United States jurisprudential approach is appropriate, but simply
notes the extraordinary differences between the approach of the United States and every other country
in the world, including countries with a common law legal heritage. 157
In contrast to United States jurisprudence, the vast majority of national constitutions and
all relevant international human rights instruments prohibit hate speech based on race, religion, or
'5' See Mark Berman, Is Health Care a Fundamental Right? (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.opposingviews.com/i/is-health-care-a-fundamental-right [https://perma.cc/RAM3-R2W7].
152 But see Cassandra Jackson, Why the War on Affordable Health Care is a War on Black and Latinos,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 8, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cassandra-jackson/why-the-war-on-
affordable b_1567650.html [https://perma.cclDA5J-YM6D] ("Currently 21.6 percent of blacks and over 33.3 percent of
Hispanics are uninsured, compared to just 13.9 percent of whites.").
153 See supra Part II (c)(3).
154 See Philip C. Aka, Analyzing U.S. Commitment to Socioeconomic Human Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV.
417, 419-20 (2006) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Economic Security: A Human Right, Reclaiming Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights, AM. PROSPECT, SPECIAL REPORT ON U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS, Oct. 2004, at A24-A26
(arguing for the advancement and rescue of Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights).
1 STRIKING A BALANCE, HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION V (Sandra
Coliver ed., 1995).
156 Id.
'57 See Adam Liptak, Unlike Others, U.S. Defends Freedom to Offend in Speech, N.Y. TIMES (June 12,
2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/us/12hate.html [https://perma.cc/3SRV-8ZMW].
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nationality and in some cases, other categories such as sexual orientation as well. 158 In the United
States, First Amendment protection even covers speech with the declared goal of encouraging
genocide, murder and other domestic and international crimes against humanity, as long as such
activities are limited to speech and not incitements to imminent criminal action. 159 In contrast to
United States jurisprudence, all relevant international human rights instruments and the vast
majority of national constitutions prohibit hate speech based on race, religion, or nationality and
in some cases, other categories as well.160 The vast majority of the world's legal systems
understand and incorporate into their jurisprudence the assumption that speech against members
of certain groups may be actionable, provided the traditional elements of defamation or criminal
liability are present.161 Those elements are: (1) intent to materially harm a specific group; (2) by
means of speech; (3) based on actions meeting the legal definitions of defamation and/or criminal
conspiracy.162 Despite the condemnation and prohibition of such words in every relevant human
rights document,163 and the prohibition of such words in the vast majority of the world's national
constitutions and laws,164 the United States stands alone in constitutionally protecting such
speech. Significantly, the United States position is contrary to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (the ICCPR),165 the American Convention on Human Rights,166 the
158 The constitutions of Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland, and South Africa prohibit hate speech
directed at individuals because of their sexual orientation. See NOR. CONST., DEN. CONST., NETH. CONST., IR. CONST., S.
AFR. CONST. art. 16, §2(c).
1' See Liptak, supra note 160.
160 Id.
161 See Thomas J. Webb, Verbal Poison - Criminalizing Hate Speech: A Comparative Analysis and a
Proposal for the American System, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 445, 460-67 (2011).
162 Malla Pollack, Litigating Defamation Claims, 128 AM. JuRIs. TRIALS 1 (2013).
163 See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families art. 13, 30 I.L.M. 1517 (1990); Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 13, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (1990); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 4, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1969); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide art. 3, Dec. 9 1948, S. Exec. Doc. 0, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, Article 3 (1951); G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 26 (Dec. 10, 1948).
164 See, e.g., Racial Discrimination Act 1975 §IIA; Law of July 30, 1981 on the Punishment of Certain Acts
inspired by Racism or Xenophobia (1981), Holocaust denial law (1995) (Belgium); CONSTITUIyAo FEDERAL (Brazil);
CRIMINAL CODE art. 174 (Croatia); CANADA CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, art. 319(2); CRIMINAL CODE
(Order No. 909/2005) §266B (Denmark); Public Order Act 1986, ch. 64, §18 (U.K.); Racial and Religious Hatred Act
2006, ch. 1 (U.K.); CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND IMMIGRATION ACT 2008, ch. 4, §74 (U.K.); FINNISH PENAL CODE
(RIKOSLAKI/STRAFFLAGEN) ch. 11, §8 (Finland); PENAL CODE, DECRET No 2005-284 DU 25 MARS (2005), LAW AGAINST
RACISM, Loi no 72-546 du ler juillet 1972 (1972), PRESS LAWS, La loi du 29 juillet 1881 (France); GERMAN CRIMINAL
CODE (STRAFGESETZBUCH), art. 130; ICELANDIC PENAL CODE, art. 233; Constitution, §19, INDIAN PENAL CODE, e.g.
§§153A and 295A; PROHIBITION OF INCITEMENT TO HATRED ACT (1989) (Ireland); HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (1993), §61
(New Zealand); NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE, (STRAFFELOVEN), §135a; CRIMINAL CODE OF POLAND, art. 196, 256 and 257,
Broadcasting Act (1992), art. 18; SERBIAN PENAL CODE, §317; SOUTH AFRICA, ACT No. 4 of 2000: PROMOTION OF
EQUALITY AND PREVENTION OF UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION ACT; SWEDISH PENAL CODE, (BROTTSBALKEN), ch. 16, § 8.
165 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20.2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter "ICCPR"].
166 Organization of American States American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, §5, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),167 and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.168 The United States position is also directly contrary
to the Statute of the International Criminal Court which explicitly disallows a free speech defense
for "incitement to genocide." 169
The principal international human rights treaties unanimously require governments to
prohibit "hate speech" based on race, religion, or nationality. For example, the ICCPR states that
"[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."1 70  Article 13, paragraph 5 of the American
Convention contains the broadest prohibition:
[A]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitute[s] incitements to
lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on
any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be
considered as offenses punishable by law (emphasis added).1 71
The clause "on any grounds including" would seem to provide an international treaty
basis for protecting other groups from hate expression as well.
Although the European Convention does not contain an explicit prohibition of hate
speech, cases interpreting the Convention have held that such a prohibition is implicit in Articles
XVII and XIV. 172
The Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that "free speech" protection
cannot constitute a defense to persecution under that statute, even when the hate speech is
committed by organized movements that do not yet have the status of a state, and the speech
would not have the quality of traditional state action.
Relevant international treaties are unanimous and unequivocal in their condemnation of
hate speech. These treaties are, however, simply a reflection of the almost universal prohibition
of hate speech under national law, with the notable exception of the United States.173 Indeed, from
a comparative legal perspective, many constitutions already prohibit hate expression, 174 so the
effect of international law in those countries may be limited. Nevertheless, international law can
have an impact on the manner in which national courts interpret their own existing statutes.
Australia provides one such example. Australia is a signatory, with reservations, to two
167 United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art
4., 21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter "CERD"].
168 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7.1.h, July 17, 1998, A/CONF. 183/9 (Jul. 17, 1998)
(last amended 2002).
1
7 9ICCPR supra note 168, at art. 6.
170 Id. at art. 20.
171 Organization of American States, supra note 169.
172 See generally STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 158; see also Stephanie Farrior, Molding The Matrix: The
Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 66-69
(1996); Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. Netherlands, App. No. 8348/78 & 8406/78, 23 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 366 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R., 1979); Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1994).
173 See Robert A. Khan, Why Do Europeans Ban Hate Speech? A Debate Between Karl Lowenstein and
Robert Post, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545, 547 (2013).
174 Id.
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international conventions which impact attempts by countries to legislate against racial
vilification: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Numerous countries'
constitutions explicitly prohibit hate speech in a manner very consistent with the international law
prohibitions discussed above, including those of Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 17 Croatia, Fiji , and
Greece. 179
1 AZER. CONST. art. 47. provides: "(1) Everyone may enjoy freedom of thought and speech. (2) Nobody
should be forced to promulgate his/her thoughts and convictions or to renounce his/her thoughts and convictions. (3)
Propaganda provoking racial, national, religious and social discord and animosity is prohibited."
176 BULG. CONST. art. 39 provides: "(1) Everyone is entitled to express an opinion or to publicize it through
words, written or oral, sound, or image, or in any other way. (2) This right shall not be used to the detriment of the rights
and reputation of others, or for the incitement of a forcible change of the constitutionally established order, the
perpetration of a crime, or the incitement of enmity or violence against anyone."
177 CROAT. CONST. art. 39 provides: "Any call for or incitement to war, or resort to violence, national,
racial, or religious hatred, or any form of intolerance is prohibited and punishable."
178 Fi CONST. ch. 2 § 17.1(a)-(b) provides: (1) Every person has the right to freedom of speech and
expression, including: (a) freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas; and (b) freedom of the press and
other media. Fm CONST. ch. 2 § 19.1(a)-(f) provides:
A law may limit, or may authorise the limitation of, the right to freedom of expression in the
interests of: (a) national security, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or the
orderly conduct of national or municipal elections; (b) the protection or maintenance of the
reputation, privacy, dignity, rights or freedoms of other persons, including: i. the right to be free
from hate speech, whether directed against individuals or groups; and ii. the right of persons injured
by inaccurate or offensive media reports to have a correction published on reasonable conditions
established by law; (c) preventing the disclosure, as appropriate, of information received in
confidence; (d) preventing attacks on the dignity of individuals, groups or communities or respected
offices or institutions in a manner likely to promote ill will between races or communities or the
oppression of, or discrimination against, any person or persons; (e) maintaining the authority and
independence of the courts; (f) imposing reasonable restrictions on the holders of public offices in
order to secure their impartial and confidential service.
17 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 14 (Greece) provides:
(1) Any person may express and propagate his opinion orally, in writing, or in print, with due
adherence to the laws of the State. (2) The press is free. Censorship and all preventive measures are
prohibited. (3) The seizure of newspapers and other printed matter, either before or after circulation,
is prohibited. By exception, seizure after publication is permitted upon instruction by the Public
Prosecutor because of: a) insult to the Christian and all other known religions, b) insult to the person
of the President of the Republic, c) a publication which discloses information relating to the
composition, armament, and disposition of the armed forces or the fortifications of the country, or
aims at violently overthrowing the political system or is directed against the territorial integrity of
the State, d) obscene publications which manifestly offend public decency, in the cases specified by
law. (4) In all of these cases, the Public Prosecutor must, within twenty-four hours of the seizure,
submit the case to the judicial council which, within a further twenty-four hours, must decide
whether the seizure shall be maintained or withdrawn, otherwise the seizure shall be lifted ipso jure.
The publisher of the seized newspaper or other printed matter and the Public Prosecutor are allowed
to appeal to the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court. (5) The law shall determine the manner
rectifying in full through the press erroneous publications. (6) After at least three convictions within
a five year period for crimes specified in Paragraph (3) hereof, the court shall order the permanent
or temporary suspension of issue of the publication and, in serious cases, prohibit the practice of the
profession of journalist by the person convicted, as provided by law. Such suspension or prohibition
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The requirement of immediacy for speech that would be criminal but for their hate
content, is somewhat particular to United States law. 180 For example, in the United States, it is
protected free speech to call for the extermination of individuals based on their race, religion, or
ethnic origin, as long as such speech does not result in immediate criminal harm. Despite the
condemnation and prohibition of such words in every relevant human rights document,18 1 and the
prohibition of such words in the vast majority of the world's national constitutions and laws, 182
the United States stands alone in constitutionally protecting such speech. The First Amendment
protection even covers speech activities of groups with the declared goal of engaging in genocide,
murder, and other domestic and international crimes against racial, ethnic, and religious groups in
the United States, as long as these activities are limited to speech and not incitements to imminent
criminal action.183 This rule applies even when the group has taken clear steps to organize and
recruit members for what may otherwise be a criminal conspiracy to commit murder and/or
genocide.184 In other words, hatred creates, or comes very close to creating, a defense for conduct
that would otherwise constitute criminal conspiracy, or civil tort liability.
What makes the United States' approach to free speech all the more striking is that it is
not shared by any other democracy, even those that are well-known for robust political
discourse.186 Perhaps even more notable is that this approach is not shared by the United
Kingdom or other common law countries, with which the United States shares a legal heritage. 187
This is striking, as much of the reason for the peculiarly adversarial United States approach to
dispute resolution can be found in the origins of the British common law. However, the
divergence between the British and the U.S. approach in several significant areas, such as free
speech, suggests that the United States stands apart even from its common law ancestor. 188
Although there are a number of justifications for the unique position of the United States,
the most common one is to preserve the "marketplace of ideas." 189 The "marketplace of ideas" is
yet another analogy to battle, relying on the stronger argument to carry the day. Of course, as
noted below, problems arise when the "stronger" idea may not be the most meritorious, but
simply the better funded or "stronger" for other reasons. One such example would be the power of
shall commence from such time as the sentence becomes irrevocable. (7) Press offenses shall be
deemed offenses in flagrante delicto and shall be judged by the courts as the law provides. (8) The
law determines conditions and qualifications for the practice of journalism. (9) The law may lay
down that financing newspapers and periodicals be made known.
Iso Liptak, supra note 160, citing ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007).
181 See infra Part II(F)(1).
182 See generally John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 539 (2006).
183 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); National Socialist Party of America v. Village
of Skokie 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
184 The authors would argue that it may even be possible to reformulate the United States jurisprudential
approach to hate speech largely within the domain of existing tort and criminal law theories.
185 Such tort liability that otherwise may arguably exist in the absence of a hate component would include:
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment libel and false light.
186 See Liptak, supra note 160.
187 See Webb, supra note 164, at 464-65.
188 Id.
189 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). ("[The] purpose of the First
Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.")
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Nazi ideas, despite the odiousness of their substantive content, 190 or the strength of religious ideas
justifying slavery.
The attractiveness of this peculiar American approach is nevertheless difficult to deny.
An absolutist approach to free speech at least insures that all speech will be permitted without
regard to content, protecting politically unpopular groups from government regulation. 191
However, it should also be noted that numerous other democracies have managed to develop
energetic civil rights movements and a robust exchange of ideas, while still regulating speech that
transcends the boundaries of "discourse" and descends into advocacy of hatred and genocide.
In summary, it can be concluded that first, the United States jurisprudential approach to
hate speech is, as an empirical matter, out of sync with the vast majority of industrialized
democracies, even those who share a common-law legal tradition. Second, the approach of those
other democracies to hate speech, has not compromised their protection of free speech generally.
Third, the United States jurisprudential approach to hate speech is substantially inconsistent with
international law, as evidenced by all international treaties addressing the issue of free speech and
hate speech, specifically. Fourth, the U.S. approach to regulating hate speech is, to some extent,
inconsistent with U.S. and general principles of law regarding criminal conspiracy. Thus, the U.S.
approach creates a kind of criminal defense to conduct that may otherwise be actionable as a
conspiracy to commit murder, battery, or even genocide. In this sense, the United States approach
to hate speech is a vivid illustration of the value American society places on conflict, even when it
would otherwise run afoul of other fundamental legal principles, such as conspiracy to commit
murder.
However, United States jurisprudence recognizes that in the work arena, hate speech
directed at a particular group may be actionable. 192 It is actionable when it results in palpable
discrimination against, and damage to, the recipient of the hate speech.193 It would not seem a
legally radical step to extend these protections to historically discriminated groups in contexts
other than the workplace.
2. Creation of Law by the Economically Powerful through the "Battle of Ideas"
The gladiatorial approach to free speech does not just implicate the ability to exercise
hate speech against vulnerable groups. Free speech has recently been extended to corporations by
the Supreme Court, allowing corporations to influence the political process under the rubric of
"free speech" through political donations to the same extent as individuals. 194 It should be noted
that corporations always possessed the right to present their points of view through advertising
and other means, but they had traditionally been excluded from being able to enjoy the same
rights as individuals when it came to financial contributions to political candidates. 195 Free speech
190 See Liptak, supra note 160.
'9' See generally id.
192 Michael Dolgow, Where Free Speech Goes to Die: The Workplace, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-03/where-free-speech-goes-to-die-the-workplace
[https://perma.cc/45HT-E86T].
193 Id.
194 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
1 See Matt Bai, How Much has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y. TiMEs (July 17,
2012), http://www.nytimes.con2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-citizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html
[https://perma.cc/YED7-TN4Q].
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standards had previously been held to invalidate some aspects of campaign finance reform that
limited financial contributions from individuals, but those standards had never previously been
extended to prevent limitations on donations by corporations.196 In large part, this is because the
Constitution, by its own words, only protects persons, and corporations had not been held to be
people in the Constitutional sense of the word. Of course, many individuals enjoying free speech
rights are part of large corporations, thus already giving corporations a role in free speech in
political discourse. 197 However, granting corporations the right to actively participate in political
discourse directed at, or for, specific candidates, extends the rights of free speech beyond the
marketplace of ideas, to the laws relating to political financing, which has traditionally been a
somewhat distinct field from free speech, with its own set of public policy concerns.
G. Labor Standards
With respect to labor standards, the United States stands alone among industrialized
nations in failing to elaborate substantive labor standards that incorporate guaranteed vacation,198
severance pay, 199 and other standards considered basic in the rest of the industrialized world. For
example, under the British system, all employees are statutorily protected, under the Employment
Protection Act of 1978, from unfair dismissal and must be given advanced notice of dismissal, as
well as two days off with pay to look for work. Additionally, under collective dismissals, the
employer must pay redundancy or severance payments to the dismissed employees. 200 In
Germany, as in the United Kingdom, job security is provided by law.201 Dismissals which are
"socially unjustified" are legally void. 202 In Sweden, dismissals must be based on "objective
cause" and dismissed employees are entitled to severance pay. 203 The underlying premise of this
is that the employee has the right to continued employment. These examples obviously directly
contrast with the American doctrine of at-will employment. In Japan, the Japanese Constitution
"declares the right to work a fundamental human right." 204 Dismissals require an "objectively and
socially reasonable cause."205 American employees are not legally entitled to vacation, whereas in
most other industrialized countries, vacation time is mandated by the labor code or the countries'
constitutions.206
196 See generally id.
197 See generally id.
198 Tanya Mohn, U.S. The Only Advanced Economy That Does Not Require Employers to Provide Paid
Vacation Time, Report Says, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyamohn/2013/08/13/paid-
time-off-forget-about-it-a-report-looks-at-how-the-u-s-compares-to-other-countries [https://perma.cc/VS9J-RH4Q].
'99 See generally Samuel Estreicher & Jeffery M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law:
Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C.L. REV. 343, 354 (2014).
200 Clyde W. Summers, Worker Dislocation: Who Bears the Burden? A Comparative Study of Social
Values in Five Countries, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1043 (1995).
201 Id. at 1043.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1048, 51-52.
204 Id. at 1053.
205 Id.
206 See Kevin Cranman & Natasha Baker, Where in the World Are Your Employees? Institutions as Global
Employers: Employment Law Considerations in the Age of International Employemnt, 36 J. COLL. & UNIv. L. 565, 599-
600 (2010) (comparing U.S., French, and Chinese employment laws); Helene Jorgensen, Give Me A Break: The Extent of
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The United States approach to labor law is embodied in the "employment at will"
doctrine, which essentially gives both the employer and employee full freedom to terminate their
relationship with each other at any time they choose, absent a contract between the two to the
contrary. 207 The US legal system therefore relies on "gladiatorial" conflict between employers
and employees with "negotiation" as the process and labor strikes as the weapon. This American
gladiatorial free market approach posits that the parties, rather than the government, should arrive
at the substantive terms. 208 Without drawing normative conclusions about the American approach,
it suffices to note that every other industrial democracy has recognized the glaring inequality
between the employer and employee in most hiring situations and have generally instituted some
kind of minimum job security standards for non-executive employees, as noted above.
The American rule was first iterated in 1877 by Horace Gay Wood, a legal scholar and
treatise writer from New York. He stated the rule as follows: "[T]he rule is inflexible that a
general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at -will and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. . . " 209 One curious aspect about
Wood's rule is that the author claimed to be simply restating the existing rule rather than creating
a new rule. In fact, the rule reflected neither an established American rule nor the British rule
regarding employment. Indeed, there has been controversy as to whether Wood created his rule of
employment at will from an inaccurate synthesis of existing precedent.210
Whatever the reasons for Wood's establishment of his rule, it became the
overwhelmingly dominant rule in American law, and reflected the predominance of a laissez-faire
approach to economics existing at the time. Indeed, this was the legal period known in America as
the "Lochner Era" in which socially established rules for workers, or vulnerable groups in society,
were eschewed in favor of permitting the parties with the most economic and political power to
Paid Holidays and Vacation, Center for Economic and Policy Research (Sept. 3, 2003),
http://www.cepr.neUdocuments/publications/giveme_a_break.htm [https://perma.cc/ZCF5-GLB9] (comparing time off
between U.S., European, and Japanese workers); Jeanne Sahadi, Who Gets the Most (and Least) Vacation, CNNMONEY
(June 14, 2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/06/12/pf/vacation-days-worldwide [https://perma.cc/9Y3H-TX52] ("All
members of the European Union . . . must provide workers with a minimum of 20 paid vacation days a year plus public
holidays.").
207 Liz Ryan, How At-Will Employment Hurts Business, FORBES (May 1, 2014), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/lizryan/2014/05/01/how-at-will-employment-hurts-business [https://perma.cc/JLB9-ZQED?type=image].
208 See, e.g., Valley Mould & Iron Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 116 F.2d 760, 764 (1940) (stating the purpose of
National Labor Relations Act was to protect the right of the employee to collectively bargain with the employer regarding
labor terms.) Federal policy favors arbitration or other forms of extra-judicial methods in resolving labor disputes, but
does not limit the NLRB to utilizing solely these methods. N.L.R.B. v. Local 282, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 344 F.2d 649, 652 (1965). See also Marion Crain, Work Matters, 19
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 365, 374 (2010) ("U.S. law treats the employment relation as if it were nothing more than a
market transaction, as if labor were nothing more than a commodity, as if workers invested nothing more than their
sweat.").
209 HORACE GAY WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877).
210 Compare Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 126 (1976) and Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733,
739 (1991) with Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 551, 552, 554 (1990). For an important empirical contribution to the historical debate, see generally, Andrew P.
Morris, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV.
679 (1994).
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set the rules. 2 11 Although framed in terms of freedom of contract and freedom to negotiate, the
Lochner era actually prevented workers and other subaltern classes from fighting for their own
rights in the political system. This result was directly contrary to the ostensibly adversarial ethos
of American democracy. Indeed, the enshrining of employers' rights as Constitutional rights
precluded meaningful adversarial combat in the political arena and was therefore incapable of
being challenged via the democratic process.212
This emphasis on the primacy of contract law over worker rights is reflected much more
broadly in American contract law. As the discussion below demonstrates, labor law is a vivid
illustration of this approach, but far from the only one.
H. Supremacy of Contract: The Illusion of a Fair Battle
One of the most pronounced areas where the adversarial, gladiatorial mode of issue
resolution is employed is in the area of contracts. Judicial commentators recognize that the United
States legal system reflects an unusually strong adherence to the supremacy of contract.213 Such a
value is especially prominent in the United States because contracts are the result of a battle, or
negotiation, between two parties. The results are not determined by legal rules established by the
state, but rather by the parties themselves through their adversarial negotiation. Indeed, the
preference for contract over state-enforced standards is so pronounced that courts have enforced
contractual provisions requiring arbitration over access to the courts even in contexts where the
contracts could only be characterized as adhesion contracts.214 Examples include mandatory
arbitration clauses in labor agreements and consumer contracts. 215 Taken to its logical conclusion,
supremacy of contract can effectively derogate the most fundamental rights of most Americans,
including the right of access to the court system.216 Indeed, in 2011, the Supreme Court
determined that consumers can contract away their right, in a contract of adhesion, to join
together as a class to take on the big corporations.217
211 See generally Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition,
70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991).
212 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
213 See David P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition, 16 YALE HUM.
RTs. DEv. J. (2013) 1, 13 ("The freedom of contract was imported with the rest of the common law in the founding of our
country, and provided a bedrock on which our society was conceived ... While restrictions of many shapes and sizes are
expected on many different types of contracts, the inherent ability of an individual to contractually obligate himself and
likewise receive the obligation of another has roots that go back thousands of years, at least for the privileged. Given the
broad scope of authority conveyed by the right to contract which literally extends from birth to death and even beyond, it
is one of the most powerful rights we possess.").
214 Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer Protection and the
Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DePaul L. REV. 1191, 1192-8 (2001).
215 See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
216 Linda S. Mullinex, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory
Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 296 (1988) ("The thesis of this Article is that the supremacy of
contract law over long-established jurisdictional doctrines has significantly eroded certain fundamental litigation rights.
This is particularly egregious insofar as various mechanisms for securing consensual adjudicatory procedure are becoming
pervasive throughout a wide array of party relationships.")
217 Concepcion, supra note 220 at 1760 ("Although the rule does not require classwide arbitration, it allows
any party to a consumer contract to demand it ex post. The rule is limited to adhesion contracts . . . A provision in a
contract of adhesion (for example, requiring a consumer to decide very quickly whether to pursue a claim) might increase
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On the one hand, this preference for "negotiated standards" over standards instituted by
the government presumes that there is a real negotiation between the parties. On the other hand, a
legal realist would argue that the legal system is aware that there is actually no real negotiation
but that it has no qualms about consistently enforcing the rights of the more powerful party to a
one-sided "negotiation." As noted by one legal scholar:
Contract law, due to its inherent flexibility as private law, is a tool that companies can
use to achieve strategic goals within the legal environment and, more creatively, to frame
its business activities outside a prescribed set of rules that make up the legal
environment. In other words, contract law can be used in business to create a more
favorable legal environment, by avoiding obstacles presented by immutable rules of
law. 2 18
Again, one of the ways corporations create a favorable legal environment for themselves
is by strong-arming consumers, patients, and employees into forced arbitration. 219 This is
accomplished under the rubric of freedom of contracts. The Supreme Court consistently sides
with big corporations when it assumes that those who are accepting the terms of a contract with
an employer, hospital, or insurance company have a choice when presented with an adhesion
contract. 220
Today, many credit card providers, banks, insurers, health care providers, service
providers, product sellers, and employers are using small print clauses to require
individuals to trade their right to a day in court for a right to arbitrate future claims.
Pursuant to the FAA, the clauses need not be signed to be enforceable; therefore many
companies simply use envelope stuffers, warranty provisions, or employee handbooks to
specify the available procedural recourse. Other companies obtain a signature on a credit
card or employment application, a form filled out in a doctor's office, or a loan
agreement. Sometimes the clauses are provided on-line, and "accepted" by the customer
who clicks 'enter'. 221
In Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that forced arbitration
in a class action suit was acceptable even where the evidence showed that many of the plaintiffs
were uneducated and poor and did not even understand what arbitration was at the time they
the speed and efficiency of arbitrating a dispute, but the State can forbid it.").
218 Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. Bus. L.J.
727, 750 (2010).
219 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.con/2015/11/01lbusiness/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.htm [https://perma.cc/H6LS-M3BZ].
220 Gilmer v. Interstate, 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). ("Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context"); Koveleskie v.
SBC Capital Markets, Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999) (This case also involved signing a U-4 form agreeing to
mandatory arbitration as in Gilmer. But in this case, the court ruled that the arbitration was enforceable even if it was a
condition to employment).
221 Jean R. Stemlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer
and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MiAMIL. REV. 831, 834-35 (2002).
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agreed to the employment terms.222 The defendant, on the other hand, was a multi-million dollar
company generating more than $850 million in earnings and was considered "large" and
"sophisticated."223 In a marvelous example validating the arguments of the most cynical legal
realists, a unanimous panel disagreed that the contract was not enforceable, admitting that, "[a]
ruling of unconscionability based on this analysis alone could potentially apply to every contract
of employment in our contemporary economy." 224
The problem with arbitration is that those who have economic advantages ('Haves')
frequently have legal advantages as well. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow notes:
While some argued a version of "[w]hy the 'Haves' come out ahead" by suggesting that
the least powerful were being forced into systems of second class justice in
neighborhood justice mediation just as they were achieving more legal rights "on the
books," others pointed out that it was the "Haves" who were in fact exiting the system by
first choosing more streamlined and controlled forms of private justice when they
disputed with each other, and now when they impose mandatory private dispute
resolution on their employees, clients, customers, patients, franchisees, and licensees. To
put it simply, the "Haves" come out ahead by being able to choose and manipulate what
process will be used to enforce substantive rights.2 25
This is demonstrated by the modified gladiatorial approach of arbitration - even the
protections normally provided by rules of evidence do not apply. Discovery is very limited and
the person overseeing the whole process is not even required to have legal training. 22 All of this
is accomplished because the individual is forced to contract away all his rights with the blessing
of the courts. 22 7
At the other end of the spectrum, European law prescribes that "any term of a consumer
contract, with the exception of subject matter and price, can be challenged on the grounds that it
has not been individually negotiated and is unfair."228 In addition, mandatory "pre-dispute"
arbitration, not covered by "legal provision," is prima facie evidence of unfairness and therefore
void. 229
Some EU countries have laws and regulations that empower their populations to
negotiate better terms, rather than leaving it up to the free market. For example, Germany has
strict guidelines regarding arbitration. Companies that wish to include a pre-dispute arbitration
222 303 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2002).
223 Id. at 501-502.
224 Id. at 501.
225 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat
Players in ADR, 15 OIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19, 25 (1999). (Author "explore[s] theoretically and address[es]
empirically ... the question of whether the 'haves' come out ahead in ADR too, as they do in the more official arena of
litigation").
226 Amanda Perwin, Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Civil Injustice by Corporate America, CENTER FOR
JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY (2005), https://www.centerjd.org/content/white-paper-mandatory-binding-arbitration-civil-
injustice-corporate-america [https://perma.cc/2M4T-R92B].
See generally Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 224.
228 Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the
United States, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 357, 363 (2002).
229 Id. at 366.
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agreement, must do so "in a separate and mutually signed document that solely contains the
agreement to arbitrate." 230 Moreover, an arbitration agreement between an employer and
employee requires a "separate system of arbitral proceedings," in which the tribunal consists of
"an equal number of workers and employers." 231
Perhaps the difference in attitude can be attributed to "legal tradition." 232 European law
takes a much less absolutist approach toward contracting, whereas the U.S has a more gladiatorial
focus on absolute supremacy of contract regardless of how unfair the outcome. 233 One
commentator has explained:
Whereas American law seems focused on the freedom of the parties to commercial
transactions to arrange their affairs in accordance with their own needs, the European
approach seeks to protect those whom it considers to be the weaker party to a
commercial transaction. At its simplest, and perhaps therefore most misleading, the
American approach gives primacy to a more absolute concept of autonomy of the will,
whereas the European approach holds that public policy may limit that autonomy.234
This is exemplified by the fact that "[u]nlike European . . . systems, the United States ...
system provides for the right to jury trial in civil cases, broadly available class action procedures
that permit claimants to aggregate small claims, and a wider availability of punitive damages.
American businesses use arbitration to reduce their . . . risks from each of these sources." 235
Additionally, as noted by Caroline Fredrickson:
One of the fundamental differences between civil and common law systems is that in the
former [h]uman dignity and personal freedom derive from the rights and duties laid
down in law. Law therefore serves as a guide to freedom and right living. In the common
law tradition, by contrast, freedom precedes law; freedom, after all, is the individual's
natural state; judges therefore make law on a case-by-case basis as persons seek
remedies for intrusions upon their freedom. 236
The U.S. holds freedom of contract in such high regard that one judge, in writing a legal
opinion, remarked: "The right to contract freely with the expectation that the contract shall endure
according to its terms is as fundamental to our society as the right to speak without restraint." 237
230 Peter B. Rutledge & Anna W. Howard, Arbitrating Disputes Between Companies and Individuals:
Lessons From Abroad, 65 DiSP. RESOL. J. 30, 34 (2010).
231 Id. (citing PATRICIA NACIMIENTO & CONSTANTIN DOCHS, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2008, 140 (Alan Falach, et al., eds., Global Legal Group (UK) 2008)).
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233 Id. at 385.
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II. CONCLUSION
The uniquely adversarial nature of the United States legal system, rooted in the medieval
English system of "trial by battle," has replicated itself in almost all aspects of American society,
distinguishing the United States from even its common law counterparts that shared the genesis of
their legal systems in English "trial by battle." Even resolution of basic Constitutional concepts is
subject to battles between parties, rather than a proactive determination by a Constitutional Court
as can be found in many other legal systems.
American society is unique from all other industrialized nations to the extent that it
employs adversarial techniques to resolve conflicts in the areas of contract law, criminal law,
constitutional law, labor law, and economic and social policy, in addition to its litigation-based
legal system. These adversarial methods of not only resolving disputes but also creating policy
outcomes tends to perpetuate existing power hierarchies: those with power and the "tools of
battle" accompanying it are better able to compete in such a context. The much-vaunted American
emphasis on procedural fairness thus masks an underlying substantive unfairness in outcomes.
Proscribed rules of battle, with a putative emphasis on "fairness," mean little if the battle itself is
fought by parties with vastly different resources.
At a minimum, the extraordinary differences between the uniquely American adversarial
legal, economic and political systems and the systems of other developed democracies, including
ones with a common-law heritage, suggest that those differences cannot simply be the results of
happenstance; rather, they have an underlying purpose. This article does not claim that
perpetuating existing power structures is the sole consequence of this system, but it serves as a
useful springboard for further empirical and normative investigation of the precise implications of
this uniquely adversarial societal system.
